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Abstract
This article is an exploration in the tradition of new institutional
economics of the possibility that institutional conditions have a significant role in
determining the success of credit cards and debit cards. The article examines
differences in credit-card and debit-card usage between the United States and
Japan. Although I do not doubt that social and psychological factors have some
significance, I contend that three institutional factors also have useful explanatory
power: the freedom of banks to enter the industry; low telecommunication costs,
and the size of the market.
The article provides a detailed description of card usage in the two
countries, relying on government statistics and the results of a series of interviews
with industry executives in both countries. Generally, credit cards in Japan are
used for a smaller share of transactions, with a higher average amount, and with
less borrowing per transaction. The costs to merchants that take the cards and the
rates of fraud also are noticeably higher in Japan than in the United States. The
article argues that the difference in usage is attributable primarily to regulations
that largely excluded banks and their affiliates from credit-card lending until
1992. For whatever reason, it is clear that the credit card as it exists in Japan is
not nearly so useful a product as the credit card in the United States. That
explains the smaller rate of usage and the lower borrowing rates. Also, it is to be
expected that Japanese consumers would use cash for smaller transactions for
which American consumers would use credit cards (which explains the higher
average-transaction size in Japan). The article concludes that the differences in
discount rates and fraud rates are more likely to be transient, but attributable to a
combination of factors, including the comparatively small payment-card market
and high telecommunication costs, both of which have hampered the
sophistication of responses to fraudulent transactions.
Debit cards are used quite rarely in Japan – the first general-use debit
card was not introduced until the spring of 2000. Although that card is cheaper
for the merchants that take it than credit cards, and also is much more resistant to
fraudulent transactions, the article suggests that the debit card will not find as
large a market in Japan as it has in the United States. The reason is that the shift
of the credit card from its use as a borrowing device here to its use as a near-cash
payment device in Japan leaves a much smaller niche for the debit card in Japan.
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CREDIT CARDS AND DEBIT CARDS
IN THE UNITED STATES AND J APAN
The widespread use of cards is one of the most salient
features of consumer retail payment systems in the United States.
American consumers use those cards to pay for about one-fourth of
their retail purchases each year.1 And this is not a static
phenomenon; among other things, the share of debits cards 2 in those
transactions, though still relatively small, is rising rapidly.3 That
pattern of use is not, however, typical of other countries. Even in
some highly industrialized nations, consumers use cards to pay for
purchases much less frequently. Statistics from the Bank of
International Settlements, for example, suggest about 60 card-based
payment transactions per person per year in the United States, but

1

See Consumer Payment Systems, NILSON REP ., Dec. 2000 (Issue
729) [hereinafter 1999 U.S. Payment Systems Data], at 1, 6. I rely throughout
this paper on the Nilson Report for statistics regarding the American card
industry. Although the source of the statistics published in the Nilson Report is
rarely clear, I follow the lead of American government agencies and earlier
academics, which generally have accepted them as authoritative.
2

Generally speaking, a debit card is a card that pays for transactions by
removing funds from a specified bank account at the time of the transaction. In
the American market, the functional difference between a debit card and a
credit card is that the funds are removed from the bank account automatically a
few days after the transaction, where a credit card would lead to removal of
funds only at the end of the month when (if) the cardholder pays the bill. For a
general introductory discussion of debit cards, see RONALD J. MANN,
P AYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 141-46 (1999).
3

See Credit & Debit Cards, NILSON REP ., Nov. 2000 (Issue 726)
[hereinafter 1999 US Card Data], at 1, 7 (reporting 6.4 billion U.S. debit-card
purchase transactions in 1999, for a total of $231 billion); 1999 U.S. Payment
Systems Data, supra note 1, at 1, 6 (reporting that debit cards were used for
6.1% of 1999 consumer purchases, representing 4.7% of the dollar amount of
consumer purchases); see also Visa and MasterCard – US 1998, NILSON
REP ., Apr. 1999 (Issue 689), at 1, 5-7 (showing growth of Visa and MasterCard
debit transactions from 400 million in 1994 to 2.9 billion in 1998).
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only 4 such transactions per person per year in Japan.4 Similarly, no
more than half of American cardholders pay their bills each month,
which means that about half of American cardholders borrow on their
cards each month; in Japan, by contrast, borrowing appears in only
about one-tenth of credit-card transactions.5
The reasons for the use (or disuse) of cards have several
important policy ramifications. First, in the countries in which cards
are used frequently, their success suggests that they generally
provide payment more cheaply and effectively than competing retail
payment systems. By lowering the transaction costs of retail
transactions, those systems generally bolster the efficiency of the
economy’s retail sector. Second, in this country at least, leading
scholars associate the credit card with an embarrassingly high rate of
consumer bankruptcy – generally the highest of any industrialized
country.6 Third, there is good reason to believe that wide use of
credit cards is inversely related to a nation’s savings rate. If, as some
scholars argue, credit-card usage causes the decline in savings,7 then
policies that foster credit-card usage are relevant to those aspects of
macroeconomic planning that are affected by savings rates. Thus,
concerned policymakers should welcome an enhanced understanding

4

See Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems, Retail Payments in Selected Countries: A Comparative
Study 23 chart 5 (Sept. 1999), available at http://www.bis.org [hereinafter
BIS, Comparative Payments Study].
5

For details, see infra pp. 19-25.

6

See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT
ch. 4 (2000) (detailed data and analysis of the relation between the credit-card
industry and consumer bankruptcy in the United States). The view is supported
by analysis from government experts as well. See also Diane Ellis, The Effect
of Consumer Interest Rate Deregulation on Credit Card Volumes, Chargeoffs, and the Personal Bankruptcy Rate, BANK TRENDS 98-05 (FDIC,
Division of Insurance, March 1998).
7

See ROBERT . D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S ADDICTION TO CREDIT chs. 4-5, 10 (2000).
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of the institutional factors that motivate the use of cards in general
or the use of cards as a borrowing device in particular.
At the outset, it is natural to wonder whether there is
something about payment cards that is uniquely attractive to certain
types of consumer personalities. Thinking in that vein, you might
suppose that card-based payment systems are more attractive to the
relatively profligate and confident consumers of the United States
and less attractive to the more prudent and cautious consumers in
countries such as Japan.8 Although there doubtless is some truth to
that sort of psycho-social explanation, those kinds of factors
necessarily are so vague that it is difficult to use them in any
predictable way.9 The purpose of this paper is to explore the

8

See MANNING, supra note 7, at 301 (attributing limited credit-card
usage in Japan to fear of “American-style debt”). Although it is difficult to
provide objective support for such a phenomenon, recent surveys of Japanese
voters do suggest widespread discomfort with the use of credit cards. For
example, one 1991 survey of 2,000 voters by Yomiuri Shimbun found that 64%
found it not very desirable or not very desirable at all for Japan to become a
cashless society in which people did not need to carry cash because of cardbased payment systems. A 1998 survey of 2,000 voters by Asahi Shimbun
reports that 59% feel uneasy when they shop with credit cards. {Summary of
survey data on file with author.} Given the widespread use of credit cards in
the United States, it would be surprising to see similar results from such surveys
in this country.
9

I discuss the relevance of the relatively high Japanese savings rates
infra pp. 34-38. The other most commonly mentioned factor is the perception
that Americans fear to carry cash because of crime while Japanese are willing
to carry cash because of the low rate of crime in Japan. I do not discuss that
factor because of a combination of its intractability and my skepticism.
Whatever statistical analysis might show about the comparative rate of
muggings in downtown Tokyo and the downtown areas of the largest cities in
the United States, my impression is that cash in the United States is used much
less frequently even in areas (most of the areas where I have lived in this
country) where even a perception of a substantial risk of mugging seems most
unlikely. For data comparing U.S. and Japanese willingness to use and carry
cash, see infra note 15.
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relevance of more objective aspects of the legal and economic
institutions that exist in a particular country. Thus, whatever the
relevance of social and psychological factors, I think it is clear that
institutional factors can explain a surprisingly large part of the
differences in the use of credit and debit cards in different countries.
As with any analysis of complex and interconnected
phenomena, the power of the analysis depends in important ways on
the boundaries of the system that is selected for analysis.10
Accordingly, because the selection of boundaries for the system to
be analyzed necessarily is arbitrary, it nevertheless is important to be
clear at the outset as to exactly what this paper attempts to analyze:
the system by which consumers in a country use cards to make
payments for their retail purchases. Thus, although the system for
providing consumer credit obviously is closely related to that
system,11 I treat the system for consumer credit as part of the
background environment (out of which the payment-card system
develops) rather than an integral part of the payment-card system
itself. Similarly, although the push of globalization – and the global
payment-card brands – makes the boundaries of a particular country

Another reader suggested to me the possibility that gender differences
might explain some of the difference. If men and women have differing
preferences for cash and credit cards – perhaps because of differing levels of
concern about crime, perhaps because of differing levels of receptiveness to
new technology – and if men and women make different patterns of purchases
in the two countries – perhaps because women have a more traditional role in
Japanese society than they do in the United States – then the pattern of creditcard usage would be different in Japan. Although that is an intriguing
suggestion, and may provide some part of an explanation for different usage, it
seems to me even more difficult to analyze than the factors that I examine here.
10

See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 479, 497-502 (1997).
11

The connection is most obvious in the sense that (at least in the
United States) profits from consumer lending on credit cards can be viewed as
subsidizing the issuance of credit cards as a payment device. See, e.g., infra
pp. 50-51.
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less important than they were in earlier decades,12 I operate in this
article on the assumption that national boundaries continue to matter
in important ways.
Working from that perspective, this article suggests that three
institutional factors have general explanatory power. Although a
variety of other institutional considerations might have some
relevance,13 I argue that the three central factors associated with the
success of credit and debit cards are:

12

See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE
TREE (1999).
13

For example, it seems likely that the failure of checks to develop in
Japan has some relevance to the limited success of the credit card, if only
because the limited familiarity of Japanese consumers with noncash retail
payment systems at the time credit cards first were introduced might have made
Japanese consumers less receptive than American consumers. See JAPANESE
BANKERS ASSOCIATION, PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN JAPAN 3 (2000) (reporting that
checks are used for only 5% of Japanese non-cash payments, compared to 74%
of such payments in the United States). More generally, this reflects Japan’s
status as a “giro” country (that is, a country that pays by cash and electronic
transfer) rather than a “cheque” country. See BIS, Comparative Payments
Study, supra note 4, at 10 (characterizing Australia, Canada, France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States as cheque countries and the continental EU and
Japan as giro countries).
For several reasons, this article does not pursue that possibility. The
biggest problem with placing weight on the success of checks as an institutional
precursor for card-based payment systems is that the reasons for the success
and failure of checks in different countries are no better understood than the
reasons for the success and failure of card-based payment systems. The most
persuasive explanation for the success of checks in the United States is the
early and forceful intervention of the Federal Reserve to provide a subsidized
check-collection system that made the check the only method for long-distance
payments that was free both to the payor and the payee. See R. Alton Gilbert,
The Advent of the Federal Reserve and the Efficiency of the Payments
System: The Collection of Checks, 1915-1930, in 37 EXPLORATIONS IN
ECONOMIC HISTORY 121, 125-32 (2000). To my knowledge, Japanese scholars
have not yet fully explained the Japanese experience, although Professor
Tomotaka Fujita currently is examining the topic. See e-mail from Tomotaka
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• A regulatory environment that permits free participation by
banks in the credit-card market (because depositary
institutions are best-placed to develop card-based payment
and credit products)
• Low
telecommunication
costs
(because
low
telecommunication costs foster an effective anti-fraud
system)
• The size of the national retail economy (because of
economies of scale in the rapid implementation of
technological advances)
Although I hope eventually to study the development of cardbased payment systems in other countries, for now I have studied
only the United States and Japan. As this article explains, a
comparison of those two countries shows how each of those factors
has supported a speedier and more successful adoption of card-based
payment systems in the United States than in Japan. To put it more
specifically, I argue that the limited use of payment cards in Japan is
related in important ways to historical exclusion of banks from the
industry, to Japan’s unusually high telecommunication costs, and to
the relatively small size (at least in comparison to the United States)
of its payment-card market.14 The first part of the article briefly
discusses those factors and analyzes their relation to the success of
card-based payment systems.

Fujita, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo, to Ronald J.
Mann (Nov. 7, 2000).
14

The third factor in this case depends to some degree on the others.
The payment-card market in Japan is much smaller than the market in the
United States not so much because Japan is a small country – it is not – but
because of the effects of the first two factors. My point is that the smallness of
the market (caused in this case by the other two factors) itself limits the
system’s ability to develop and grow. In other countries that would have small
payment-card markets even if cards were used universally, that factor should
have independent significance.
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The second part of the article compares the role of credit
cards in the two countries. It starts by comparing the patterns of
usage. The primary topic of interest is the limited use of credit in
the Japanese credit-card industry, which I attribute to the history of
bank regulation in Japan. The article then considers the effectiveness
of the Japanese system, which has relatively high costs and also
experiences relatively large losses to fraud. I argue that the high
costs are related to the lack of credit usage by Japanese consumers
(because Japanese card issuers earn minimal income from interest)
and that the fraud losses are caused by high telecommunications
costs.
The last part of the article discusses debit cards, focusing on
their minuscule usage in Japan. I attribute the small role for debit
cards to the strange debit-like product into which the Japanese credit
card has developed. Because the credit card in Japan has mutated to
fill a product niche quite similar to the niche that the debit card fills
in the United States, there is little remaining room for the debit card
to succeed. Thus, although the Japanese debit card in some ways
seems to be a more effective product than the American debit card,
and in the abstract one that should be more attractive to cashpreferent Japanese consumers,15 it seems unlikely to garner a
significant role in Japanese commerce.

15

A 1998 survey of 2,000 Japanese voters by Asahi Shimbun reports
that 37% of Japanese adults carry more than ¥30,000 (about $270) and 81%
more than ¥10,000 (about $90). {Summary of survey results on file with
author.} My impression based on anecdotal evidence is that similar figures in
the United States would be much lower. For other related data from Japan, see
JAPANESE BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 13, at 2 (reporting that the
amount of outstanding currency in Japan (as a share of GDP) is more than
twice what it is in the United States and describing “the Japanese citizens’
strong preference for using cash as a means of payment”); see also id. at 16
(discussing typical ATM policy permitting withdrawal of ¥2,000,000 per day
(about $18,000), some 40 times the typical United States limit); Gov’t, Banks
Keen To Lower Debit Card Limits, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Jan. 18, 2001
[hereinafter Lower Debit Card Limits] (reporting plans to lower the limit to
¥500,000). The difference in the amount of cash in the hands of consumers
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I. THE INSTITUTIONAL PRECURSORS
OF CREDIT CARDS AND DEBIT CARDS
Because the ultimate goal of this research is to develop a
general understanding of the institutional factors that support and
retard the growth of card-based payment systems, it is important to
start by offering a general description of the institutional precursors
identified in my work in the United States and Japan. My analysis
focuses on three particular institutional factors that in my view affect
the development and growth of card-based payment systems: the
breadth of banking powers, the level of telecommunication costs, and
the size of the retail economy.
A. Banking Powers
The first and most important of those factors is a regulatory
climate that permits free participation by banks in the credit-card
industry. As the discussion below suggests, my theoretical basis for
that claim is not overwhelming: there is no obvious reason why nondepositary institutions cannot successfully deploy card-based
payment products. To be sure, they have a significant disadvantage in
promulgating debit cards – because only depositary institutions have
immediate access to the accounts against which debit-card payments
are made. But no such difficulty bars participation by non-depositary
institutions in the credit-card industry. Although my theoretical
understanding remains quite tentative, the historical record in the
United States and Japan provides considerable support for my thesis.
Accordingly, I defer discussion of theoretical explanations for that
phenomenon, first offering a brief summary of the historical
patterns.
1.

Historical Patterns

might be even larger than that data suggests, because the share of the
American currency supply held in other countries probably is greater than the
share of Japanese currency supply held in other countries.
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As others have explained, the credit-card market as it exists in
the United States today developed in the late 1960’s and 1970’s out
of a relatively small earlier market for payment cards exemplified by
American Express, Diners Club, and Carte Blanche in the early
1960’s.16 As the name “payment” card suggests, those cards did not
contemplate an extension of credit; they provided only a payment
function – facilitating transactions at distant merchants that would be
reluctant to accept checks from the cardholder.17
The general-purpose credit card – and the high rate of
borrowing that makes that card profitable – did not develop until the
1970’s and 1980’s, and when it did develop it came largely from
efforts by American banks (primarily Bank of America in
California).18 Notwithstanding the first-mover advantage of its
initially dominant payment card, American Express – an experienced,
sophisticated, and well-capitalized player in the financial
marketplace – was unable to develop a successful credit-card
product. Indeed, its repeated unsuccessful efforts to develop a
successful credit-card product cost it staggering sums of money.19
The credit card as a borrowing device developed uniquely as a bank
product.
A similar pattern appears in Japan, which has a long history of
regulatory limitations on the participation of banks and their

16

See, e.g., DAVID EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH
P LASTIC: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 61-84
(1999).
17

See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 62-65. The market
for that card depended on a sufficiently large country for remote travel to be
frequent and also on a payment market in which checks were common. Those
cards filled a niche created by the difficulty of using existing noncash payment
systems (principally checks) to make payments in remote locations.
18
19

See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 65-69.

See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 75 (discussing
heavy losses incurred by American Express in its attempts to enter the creditcard market).
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affiliates in the credit-card market. The precise reason for the
exclusion is not entirely clear. Mark Ramseyer and Frances
Rosenbluth argue that the exclusion generally was designed to
protect smaller credit companies that would have suffered from
competition with the banks.20 At least in part, however, it seems also
to have been designed to protect retailers as well.21 In any event, for
whatever reason, banks (but not their affiliates) were entirely barred
from issuing credit cards until 1982.22 Not until 1992 were banks or
20

See J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH,
JAPAN’S P OLITICAL MARKETPLACE 55-57 (1993). Although it would be natural
to think that limiting the ability of banks to provide credit to consumers would
harm retailers (by limiting sales), the regulation in part seems to have been
designed specifically to benefit retailers. In particular, among the prime
beneficiaries of the regulation were the senmonten kai, finance companies
operated by associations of small retailers. For sources discussing the need to
protect small retailers, see Kurejitto Sangyô Bukai, Kappu Hanbai Shingikai
[The Credit Industry Committee in the Installment Sales Council], Kurejitto
Sangyô no Kongo no Arikatani tsuite [Interim Report: The Desirable
Future of the Credit Industry] (1990) [hereinafter Report on the Future of
the Credit Industry] (discussing the need for protection of small retailers as
part of the historical background behind the restriction preventing bank-affiliated
issuers from issuing cards that allow revolving credit).
21

The distinction is a fine one, because among the most prominent of
the smaller finance companies affected by the regulation were the senmonten
kai, finance companies operated by associations of small retailers. For sources
discussing the need to protect small retailers, see Report on the Future of the
Credit Industry, supra note 20 (discussing the need for protection of small
retailers as part of the historical background behind the restriction preventing
bank-affiliated issuers from issuing cards that allow revolving credit).
22

Under the Ginkôhô [Banking Law] of 1927, Law No. 21 of 1927,
there was no express bar of credit-card services, but administrative guidance
excluded banks from that business. See GENDAI GNKÔHÔ TORIHIKIHÔ [THE
CURRENT BANKING LAW] 68 (Kinyûzaiseijijyûkenkyûkai, Ichirô Katô & Shôzô
Yoshihara eds. 1987) [hereinafter GENDAI GINKÔHÔ TORIHIKIHÔ]; Arthur J.
Alexander, Consumer Credit in Japan Since the Bubble Economy’s End,
JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE REPORT , June 20, 1977 (No. 23), at 9, available
at http://www.jei.org/Archive/JEIR97/9723f.html. The Ginkôhô [Banking Law]
of 1981, Law No. 59 of 1981, did not specifically authorize the credit-card
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their affiliates permitted to issue cards that allowed revolving
credit.23 And not until 2001 will Japanese banks and their affiliates
be permitted to issue cards that include a variety of other borrowing
options typical of the industry.24

business, but it did permit banks to engage in “business ancillary to banking.”
Ginkôhô [Banking Law] of 1981, Art. 10.2. That language was construed to
include the credit-card business. See GENDAI GINKÔHÔ TORIHIKIHÔ, supra, at
686; YOSHIAKI KOYAMA, GINKÔHÔ [BANKING LAW] 241 (Ôkurazaimukyôkai
1992).
23

Again, no specific statute barred revolving credit, but, based on the
sentiments expressed in a resolution accompanying a statute that amended the
Installment Sales Law, the government did not permit bank-affiliated entities to
register to offer revolving credit or other forms of kappu. For the resolution
itself, see Kappu Hanbaihô no Ichibu wo Kaiseisuru Hôritsuanni Taisuru Futai
Ketsugi [Supplementary Resolution Amending Installment Sales Law] (May 10,
1984) [hereinafter Supplementary Installment Sales Law Resolution]. For
discussion of its significance to later policy, see KINYÛ IT KENKYÛKAI [STUDY
GROUP REGARDING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN FINANCIAL SERVICES],
DEBITTO KÂDO KAKUMEI [THE REVOLUTION IN DEBIT CARDS] 53-54
(Takarajimasha 2000) [hereinafter THE REVOLUTION IN JAPANESE DEBIT
CARDS]; Dai Ippen Kurejitto Sangyô no Jittai [Part 1: The History and
Current Situation of Credit Industries], in KUREJITTO TORIHIKI
JITSUMUZENSHO [CREDIT TRANSACTION GUIDANCE] 110 (Daiichihôki 1991)
[hereinafter CREDIT TRANSACTION GUIDANCE].
24

The government ultimately decided, notwithstanding the sentiments
expressed in the Supplementary Installment Sales Law Resolution, supra note
23, to permit bank-affiliated card issuers to allow non-revolving forms of kappu
based on recommendations in Report on the Future of the Credit Industry,
supra note 20 (which had called for the government to permit bank-affiliated
companies to enter the revolving-credit business by 1992). See Tokubestu
Ronbun: Kinyû Sâbisuni Okeru Kâdo no Yakuwari to Tenbô [Special
Report: The Perspective and Function of Cards in Financial Services], in
KINYÛ JYÔHÔ SHISUTEMU HAKUSHO 3, 25 (Zaikeishôhôsha 2000); THE
REVOLUTION IN JAPANESE DEBIT CARDS, supra note 23, at 96-97; Kurejitto
Sangyô Bukai, Kappu Hanbai Shingikai [The Credit Industry Committee in the
Installment Sales Council], Kurejitto Kado no Seidoteki Seiyaku no Kaiketsu
no Arikata to Kurejitto Sangyô ni Kyôtsûsuru Kadai e no Torikumi ni
Kansuru Hôkoku [Interim Report: The Way To Solve Structural Limitations
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Two points about the resulting market structure (both
discussed in more detail in Part II) are central to my conclusions.
First, for decades after its introduction in Japan, the credit card was
not successful either in gaining a significant market share as a matter
of transaction volume or, even more surprising, in luring consumers
into borrowing with the cards when they did use them.25 Second,
during the eight years since banks have entered that market, the
usages in Japan have begun to move (albeit slowly) to bring Japanese
usage closer to the American pattern.26 When compared with the
United States experience, those features of the Japanese pattern
provide considerable circumstantial evidence regarding the
significance of untrammeled bank participation in credit-card
markets.
2.

Theoretical Explanations

The biggest difficulty is in explaining precisely why nondepositary credit-card issuers have been unable to develop
successful credit-card products. For me, two explanations are
plausible: one that relies on the informational advantage banks gain
from depositary relations, another on the value of credit cards as a
service to enhance the attractiveness to the customer of the bank as a
location for the customer’s deposits.
The first explanation is the possibility that the information
that banks acquire from their depositary and other relations with their
customers gave them a superior position to design credit-card
lending services. It is easy to forget, but the credit-card business was

in Credit Cards and a Program for Solving Common Problems in Credit
Industries] (1998).
25

See infra pp. 21-25 (discussing the limited success of Japanese
credit cards).
26

See infra pp. 27-28.
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extraordinarily risky in the early days when the modern credit-card
business model was developed.27
If it was difficult even for banks with their customer-relation
information to develop the sophistication necessary for a profitable
credit-card operation focused on their depositary customers, it is
plausible to think that other types of financial institutions without
such information advantages might have been cautious (or
unsuccessful) in pushing into the area. Of course, it seems unlikely
that the informational advantage would have great relevance in the
modern market. In the current information-rich environment, it is no
longer the case that the depositary relation is the only – or even the
best – reliable source of information about the creditworthiness of a
potential credit-cardholder. Accordingly, any advantage that banks
might have held when the system developed should have dissipated
over time.
The second explanation builds on the difficulty of the creditcard industry in its early days. From that perspective, the credit card
began not as a profitable line of business, but rather as a costly
service that banks provided as a convenience to attract customers.28
Given the limited ability of banks in the 1960’s and 1970’s to

27

See, e.g., EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 68-69
(discussing large losses in the early days of the credit-card industry incurred by,
among others, Wells Fargo, Bankers Trust, and Citibank); id. at 75 (discussing
heavy losses incurred by American Express in its attempt to enter the creditcard market); MANNING, supra note 7, at 84-86 (discussing heavy losses
incurred by Chase Manhattan and Bank of America); MANNING, supra note 7,
at 89-91 (discussing $100 million of losses by Citibank in the 1970’s and
characterizing the late 1970s and early 1980s as a “Dickensian nightmare” for
the industry as a whole); see also Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit
Cards, 3 CHAPMAN L. REV. 79, 137-38 (2000) (arguing that the credit-card
industry traditionally has been “dynamically” competitive, so that earlier entrants
periodically are replaced by late-coming more effective rivals).
28

See MANNING, supra note 7, at 89-91 (characterizing credit cards
before the 1980’s as “loss leader[s that] helped to cultivate customer loyalty and
attract new clients”).
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compete on price,29 it would have been rational for banks to attempt
to distinguish themselves from one another by offering credit-card
services even if they were unable to provide those services in a
profitable manner.30 After decades of practice, however, the industry
developed sufficient expertise to earn considerable profits from
credit-card lending.31 At that point, it would be rational for other
issuers to enter the market vigorously, even if they did not have
substantial depositary relations with their cardholders.
Given the foregoing, it should be no surprise that nondepositary institutions in the United States now are quite successful
at credit-card lending. For example, store cards in the United States
have a phenomenal ability to generate borrowings.32 But they
showed no capacity to generate those borrowing in the early days of
the industry, before banks developed and popularized the credit-card
model.33

29

See, e.g., MARCIA STIGUM , THE MONEY MARKET 968-69 (3rd ed.
1990) (discussing the importance to the market of the limitations on bank-deposit
interest imposed by the Federal Reserve’s Regulation Q).
30

See MANNING, supra note 7, at 84-85 (explaining that the first largescale use of a universal bank credit card resulted from a mailing by Bank of
America of 60,000 unsolicited credit cards to its depositary customers).
31

Cf. Alexander, supra note 22, at 10-12 (arguing that Japanese banks
are handicapped in credit-card lending because they have not had sufficient
experience to develop expertise at individual risk assessment).
32

At the end of 1999, the ratio of outstanding receivables to total annual
purchase volume for United States store cards was 81%, which compares
favorably to the analogous ratios for MasterCard’s (73%), Visa (57%),
Discover (53%), and American Express (23%). {The ratios for Visa and
MasterCard are calculated from 1999 US Card Data, supra note 3, at 7. The
ratios for American Express and Discover are calculated based on year-2000
results published at Amex Results – U.S., NILSON REP ., Jan. 2001 (Issue 732),
at 1, 7 and Discover Card Results, NILSON REP ., Jan. 2001 (Issue 732), at 1,
7.} For a discussion of historical trends of that ratio, see infra note 52.
33

See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 61-62 (discussing inhouse cards in the early days of the industry); GEORGE RITZER, EXPRESSING
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It also is true that much of the credit-card market in the
United States has been taken over by “monoline” banks, which
generally have no depositary relation with their customers. Thus, as
of 1995, only 16% of MasterCard and Visa cards issued in the
United States were issued to cardholders that had any relationship
with the issuing bank beyond the card.34 But those banks appeared
quite late in the development of the credit-card market in the United
States.35 And they depend for their success on the economies of
scale in sophisticated analysis – “credit-scoring” – of the individuals
to whom they issue cards.36 With that type of technology, it is easy
to see that the bank’s customer-relation information is not nearly so
important as it might have been in the early days of the industry.37
* * * * * * *
In sum, there are good reasons to think that a regulatory
climate that grants banks free entry into the credit-card market is a
substantial factor leading to the development of a large credit-card
market. The mechanism is not entirely clear, but there are good
reasons to think that the market would not have developed in the

AMERICA: A CRITIQUE OF THE GLOBAL CREDIT CARD SOCIETY 33-34 (1995)
(discussing the limited use of revolving credit in the early days of the industry).
34

See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 208-09.

35

See, e.g., EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 12 (discussing
the rise of monoline banks in the early 1990’s).
36

See Jane Tanner, Investing: Everyday Plastic, Spun into Gold,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com (discussing
underwriting techniques of monoline banks); Miriam Kreinin Souccar,
Providian Pitch Spurs Fear of Credit Data Poaching, AM . BANKER, Dec.
6, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 21145379 (same).
37

Looked at from another perspective, the monoline bank – credit-card
issuer without depositary relation – in some ways resembles the shinpan kaisha
that is an important player in the Japanese market. The key difference, of
course, is that the shinpan kaisha’s transactions have a much lower share of
borrowing than those of the typical American monoline bank. See infra note 58
(reporting estimates of the rate of borrowing in shinpan kaisha transactions).
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United States in the absence of the profitable and informationgenerating depositary relationship between banks and potential
cardholders.38
B. Telecommunications Costs
Another important factor is the relative level of
telecommunications costs. Those costs affect the deployment of an
effective credit-card system because of the importance of
telecommunications to an effective anti-fraud system. Most
obviously, effective protections against fraudulent credit-card
transactions require the merchant to contact the issuer at the time of
the transaction to permit the issuer to consider the likelihood that
the transaction is fraudulent. Ideally (and typically, in the United
States, at least),39 that process starts with a swiping of the card at the
merchant’s counter. The terminal at which the card is swiped
transmits to the issuer not only the card number, but also additional
information on the magnetic stripe (which helps to demonstrate the
authenticity of the card) and information about the transaction (that
helps the issuer to assess the likelihood that the cardholder is in fact
engaged in the transaction).40
Because such a process necessarily involves some form of
online connection between the merchant and the issuer, high
telecommunication costs pose an obstacle to such systems.41 The

38

For illustration of that point by comparison between Japanese and
American issuers, see infra pp. 50-51.
39

See Smart Card Economics, NILSON REP ., Sept. 2000 (Issue 724),
at 1, 5 (reporting that over 95% of U.S. Visa and MasterCard transactions are
authorized in real time, a higher rate than in any other country).
40

For a basic description of that process, see MANN, supra note 2, at

111-12.
41

See Smart Card Economics, supra note 39, at 5 (connecting the
careful authorization practices in the United States with the perception that
“[c]osts for POS [point-of-sale] terminals, telecommunications, and cardholder
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reason is that the more it costs the merchant to place those calls, the
more likely it is that the cost of making such calls routinely will
exceed the expected present value of the losses from fraud that such
calls will deter. Hence, the level of those costs presents a kind of
friction setting the level below which it is not profitable to deter
fraud: the lower those costs, the more vigorous (and successful) the
system can be in efforts to eradicate fraud.
As it happens, it is widely recognized that Japan has
telecommunication costs that are among the highest of any
developed nation.42 Among other things, those costs typically
include charges on a per-call and per-minute basis that are relatively
unusual in Western countries.43 All other things being equal, those
high costs should pose an obstacle to effective prevention of
fraudulent transactions.
C. Economies of Scale
The simplest of the institutional precursors is economies of
scale. Like most large-volume transactions, advances in information
technology are important in a variety of ways – not only in the initial
and merchant account processing are cheaper than anywhere else in the
world.”).
42

See, e.g., RICHARD KATZ , JAPAN: THE SYSTEM THAT SOURED 35
(1998) (discussing reasons for relatively high telecommunications costs in
Japan); Mark Magnier, Japan’s Big Hang-Up, LOS ANGELES TIMES, June 4,
2000, at C1, available at 2000 WL 2247206 (arguing that Japanese telephone
interconnection charges are about 4 times those in the U.S. and Britain and 2.5
times those in France and Sweden); Japanese Government Panel Urges End
to NTT Stranglehold, AGENCE FRANCE-P RESSE, Aug. 17, 2000, available at
2000 WL 24691668 (noting that local charges in Japan (for which NTT has a
monopoly) have risen by 13 percent since 1985, while long-distance charges
(for which NTT faces competition) have fallen by 78%).
43

Akiko Kashiwagi, Criticism of NTT Mounts as Japan’s Internet
Era Stalls, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 11, 2001, available at
http://www.newsonjapan.com (discussing NTT’s practice of charging by the
call and minute for telephone calls in Japan).
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issuance of the cards (discussed above), but also in the processing of
transactions.44 Because we live in a period when that technology is
developing and improving so rapidly, economies of scale are likely
to be important in the rapid development and deployment of that
technology.45 Thus, all other things being equal, marginally larger
countries should be able to deploy more sophisticated technology
more rapidly than marginally smaller countries.46 As a result, the
systems in marginally larger countries should become more
effective – less costly and more impervious to fraud – more rapidly
than systems in marginally smaller countries.47

44

See, e.g., MANNING, supra note 7, at 85, 87 (discussing research
and development that led to technological advances making it easier for creditcard operations to become profitable). Some evidence of this appears in the
increasing concentration of the various sectors of the credit-card market. For
example, in the market for acquiring and processing credit-card transactions,
First Data had a 44% market share as of 1999 (up from 36% in 1998). The top
ten acquirers increased their market share from 65.5% in 1997 to 76.2% in
1999. See Top U.S. Acquirers, NILSON REP ., Apr. 2000 (Issue 713), at 1, 9
[hereinafter 1999 US Acquisition Data] (reporting increases in concentration
from 1998 to 1999); Top U.S. Acquirers, NILSON REP ., Mar. 1999 (Issue 688),
at 1, 9 (reporting increases in concentration from 1997 to 1998). In the market
for issuing cards, the top five issuers currently control 57% of the market and
the top ten issuers control 82% of the market. Ten years ago in 1990, the top
five issuers controlled 36% and the top ten only 51%. Twenty years ago in
1980, the top fifty card issuers controlled less than 60% of the market in 1980.
See MANNING, supra note 7, at 298; Superportfolios, NILSON REPORT , Feb.
2001, at 1, 6-7 (Issue 733).
45

See RITZER, supra note 33, at 42-43 (discussing economies of scale
in the U.S. credit-card industry).
46

Of course, once the technology is developed and freely available, it
may be that economies of scale in use of the technology are minimal. Thus, this
factor suggests only a slowing of the pace of development, not a permanent
difference in the level of development.
47

As discussed in the introduction, the analysis assumes that national
borders still matter in the development of payment systems. That is, of course,
an assumption that weakens with the rise of globalization.
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II. CREDIT CARDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
Turning from abstract analysis to specifics, I start with the
credit card, the dominant card-based payment system in the world.
My analysis of the credit card proceeds in two steps. First, I discuss
how consumers use the cards in the two countries. Second, I discuss
how effectively the system processes the transactions in which the
cards are used.
A. Usage in the United States and Japan
1. Describing the Transactions
In the market for retail purchases in the United States, the
credit card is a massive success: it was used in 1998 for 14 billion
transactions worth almost $1.1 trillion dollars, about $76 per
transaction.48 Department of Commerce statistics indicate that in
1998 credit cards were used in about 18% of all transactions, for
about 23% of the value paid in all American consumer payment
transactions.49 For the most part, those transactions were conducted
as revolving-credit transactions.50 Under American practices, that

48

See 1999 US Card Data, supra note 3, at 7.

49

See 1999 U.S. Payment Systems Data, supra note 1, at 1, 6. The
credit-card’s share of retail purchase transactions doubtless is even higher,
because the share that credit cards have for non-retail payment transactions
surely is lower (close to zero) than the share that they have for retail payment
transactions. Cash, by the way, was used in 44% of all U.S. payment
transactions, but those transactions had an average amount of only $20.08,
totaling less than 19% of the total dollar transaction volume. See id.
50

In American terminology, the principal exception is a “payment card”
like American Express, which requires full payment of the balance each month.
In terms of transaction value at the merchant point of sale, American Express
currently has about a 14% share of the American market. See 1999 US Card
Data, supra note 3, at 1, 5. Even on American Express, however, the
cardholder has the power to withhold payment by the simple expedient of
neglecting to mail a check. That differs from the arrangements discussed below
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means that the cardholder decides each month what share of the total
account balance it will pay back; the cardholder is required to make
only a tiny minimal payment, in an amount that often would not
amortize the entire balance for several years.51 In practice,
somewhat more than half of American cardholders take advantage of
that option to defer payment of some or all of their credit-card
account balance each month.52 The payments that they do make are
made for the most part by writing a check and mailing it to the issuer.

for Japan, in which the issuer receives funds on the payment date through a
debit transfer from the cardholder’s account. See infra notes 61-64 and
accompanying text.
51

See MANNING, supra note 7, at 352 n.57; RITZER, supra note 33, at
95-96. The perception that those options are too lenient has motivated
congressional efforts to require various remedies designed to ensure consumer
awareness of the length of time repayment would take at the minimum payment
rates. See Dean Anason, LaFalce Sees Compromise as Reform’s Best Hope,
AM . BANKER, Apr. 29, 1999, at 3, available at 1999 WL 6034812 (discussing
possible disclosure requirements); Dean Anason, Bankruptcy Bill Is Getting
Last-Minute Tweaks, AM . BANKER, Sept. 10, 1999, at 2 (same); Michelle
Heller, Bankruptcy Reform on the Hill’s Fast Track, AM . BANKER, Feb. 7,
2001, at 1, 4 (same).
52

See MANNING, supra note 7, at 102 (reporting industry estimates
ofan increase in convenience users from 31% in 1990 t0 43% in 2000); Jeremy
Simon, More Users of Plastic Wielding It More Wisely, ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER, Apr. 18, 1999, at K05, available at 1999 WL 4295534 (reporting an
increase in “convenience users” from 29% in 1990 to 42% in 1997); Miriam
Kreinin Souccar, Mortgage Refinancing Slump Good for Card Firms, AM .
BANKER, Jan. 18, 2000, at 1, 15 (reporting MasterCard statistics indicating that
only 54% of its customers retained balances in 1998, down from 57% in 1997);
Mickey Meece, Rise in Consumer Debt Burden Is an Illusion, MasterCard
Says, AM . BANKER, Mar. 18, 1997, at 14 (reporting industry studies indicating
that 60% of credit-card users pay off their charges before interest accrues). A
good way to understand the trend is to track the ratio of outstanding balances at
any given time against the annual credit-card purchase volume. That figure was
above 70% throughout the early 1990’s, but fell to 68% in 1998, 57% in 1999,
and 53% in 2000. See Bank Cards, NILSON REP ., Sept. 1999 (Issue 699), at 1,
6 (discussing the historical trends in that metric); 1999 US Card Data, supra
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The contrast with Japan is considerable. First, Japanese
consumers plainly do not use cards as frequently as American
consumers: one recent study, for example, indicated that even
excluding cash transactions (by all accounts the dominant method of
point-of-sale payment in Japan),53 credit cards accounted for only
10% of the value of payment transactions.54 Industry statistics
indicate only ¥20.76 trillion ($190 billion) of credit-card
transactions in 1999, about 7% of the ¥300 trillion ($2.7 trillion) of
Japanese consumer spending that year.55 That reflects purchases of
about $1,500 per capita, compared to about $3,500 per capita in the
United States.56 The data also show that the average credit-card
transaction is about three times as large in Japan as it is in the United
States, in the range of ¥25,000 ($225).57

note 3, at 1, 7 (data from which the 1999 figure is calculated); Credit Cards in
the U.S., NILSON REP ., Dec. 2000 (Issue 730), at 1, 5 (reporting the 2000
figure).
53

See supra notes 13 & 15.

54

See JAPANESE BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 13, at 3. As
mentioned above, credit cards in the United States accounted for 21% of the
value of transactions even when cash is included. Excluding the 19% of
transaction value handled by cash (to make the figures comparable), the share
of credit cards in the United States would rise to 26%, more than twice the
Japanese share.
55

See NIKKEI Share Survey 100: Credit Cards, NIKKEI
INDUSTRIAL
DAILY,
Aug.
3,
2000
<http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/AC/TNKS/Search/Nni
20000803DTWNS096.html> [hereinafter NIKKEI 1999 Credit-Card Data].
56

The $3,500 figure is calculated from the data supra in the text
accompanying note 48. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (reporting 4
card transactions per person per year in Japan compared to more than 60 in the
United States).
57

I base that estimate on 1997 statistics from the Bank for International
Settlements, which show 720 million transactions for a total of ¥17.8 trillion
($160 billion). Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems, Statistics on Payment Systems in the Group of Ten
Countries 56 tbls. 12, 13 (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.bis.org

3/22/2001 Draft U.S.& JAPANESE CREDIT AND DEBIT CARDS

22

Perhaps the most striking feature of the Japanese transactions
is the limited extent to which they involve credit. The overwhelming
majority – 80% or more – of Japanese credit-card transactions are
settled by “ikkai barai” (which means something like “payment in
one cycle”).58 Under ikkai barai, the consumer agrees (at the point
[hereinafter BIS, 1998 Payments Statistics]. Although the table is not explicit
on that point, I believe that it includes only credit-card use for purchase activity,
because the total transaction value is similar to statistics published by the Japan
Consumer Credit Industry Association (JCIA). JCIA statistics show a total of
¥19 trillion ($170 billion) in Japanese credit-card shopping transactions for 1998.
NIHON NO SHÔHISHA SHINYÔ TÔKEI [JAPAN CONSUMER CREDIT INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION, CONSUMER CREDIT STATISTICS OF JAPAN] 33 (2000)
[hereinafter JCIA ANNUAL STATISTICS].
Cash advances and other finance activity are not relevant to my
research, but currently account for about one quarter of Japanese credit-card
activity. See Credit Card Use Grows Despite Debit Card Acceptance,
NIKKEI
FIN.
DAILY,
June
14,
2000,
<http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/AC/TNKS/Search/ Nni20000614D13JKN09.html>
(reporting that ¥419.2 billion ($3.8 billion) out of ¥1.73 trillion ($15 billion) of
April 2000 credit-card transactions were for cash advances and other nonpurchase activity).
58

None of the published aggregate industry data separates out the
precise share of ikkai barai or revolving credit; instead it divides transactions
into “kappu,” those which involve a substantial deferral of payment, and
“hikappu,” those which do not. Hikappu generally includes not only ikkai barai,
but also nikkai barai (payment in two installments) and bonus payment
(repayment out of the cardholder's bi-annual bonus). Kappu includes revolving
credit and installment plans that are both three or more payments and two or
more months. See KAPPU HANBAIHÔ [INSTALLMENT SALES LAW], Law No.
159 of 1961, art. 2(3). For the industry as a whole, data from the Japan
Consumer Credit Industry Association shows that kappu transactions as of 1998
were only 12.7% of all transactions, and only 3.3% of transactions at bankaffiliated card issuers. See JCIA ANNUAL STATISTICS, supra note 57, at 33.
Although I have been unable to locate published data that provides a
specific breakdown of ikkai barai, the data seem to be widely available to
participants in the industry. For a more specific breakdown (to estimate the
large market share for ikkai barai), I rely on unpublished data provided to me at
five different interviews, as follows:
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Industry-Wide: The only estimate I received of industry-wide usage of
ikkai barai stated that 87% of transaction value in the credit-card industry is
settled by ikkai barai. See Anonymous Interview One, Tokyo (Oct. 11, 2000)
[hereinafter Anonymous Interview One].
Shinpan Kaisha: As for transactions using cards issued by shinpan
kaisha, executives at the shinpan kaisha that I interviewed stated that 80% of
the transaction value at their particular company is paid by ikkai barai, and that
only 2.5% is paid by revolving credit. Anonymous Interview Two, Tokyo (Sept.
19, 2000) [hereinafter Anonymous Interview Two].
Bank-Affiliated Issuers: For bank-affiliated issuers, I received an
estimate of usage at all bank-affiliated issuers, as well as specific data from the
portfolios of two of the bank-affiliated issuers that I interviewed. The general
industry estimate suggested that 85-90% of bank-card transaction value
normally is handled by ikkai barai, and that the share of revolving credit varies in
the range of 3-5% of transaction value. Anonymous Interview Three, Tokyo
(Sept. 22 & Oct. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Anonymous Interview Three].
The first specific bank-affiliated issuer data indicated that its 1999
transactions produced 87.4% ikkai barai, 4.5% nikai barai, 3.5% bonus payment
(repayment out of the cardholder’s bi-annual bonus), and 4.6% revolving credit.
See Anonymous Interview Four, Tokyo (Oct. 17, 2000) [hereinafter
Anonymous Interview Four]. The second specific bank-affiliated issuer data
was for 1999, and indicated a 90% share for ikkai barai, 3% for nikkai barai, 2%
for bonus payments, and 5% for revolving credit. See Anonymous Interview
Five, Tokyo (Oct. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Anonymous Interview Five].
It is natural to expect that the shares of ikkai barai and revolving credit
for bank-affiliated issuers are slightly higher than they are for other issuers,
because banks and their affiliates cannot yet offer extended specified payment
options such as “sankai barai” (payment in three months) or “jukai barai”
(payment in ten months). Those options (barred to banks) amounted to about
10% of the transactions at the shinpan kaisha. See Anonymous Interview Two,
supra. Those differing percentages may begin to converge soon, because the
other options will be permitted to bank-affiliated issuers starting in 2001. See
generally supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing termination of
restrictions on non-revolving kappu products by bank affiliates).
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of purchase) that the transaction will be paid to the issuer in full on
the next monthly payment date.59
The full implications of ikkai barai for the credit-card system
come from its interaction with the general absence of the check
from the Japanese consumer payment system.60 The ordinary
Japanese consumer pays bills by a credit transfer or a prearranged
debit transfer (similar to the automated clearinghouse transactions
American consumers often use to pay mortgages or other regularly
recurring bills). Thus, in the credit-card transaction, the customer’s
consent to ikkai barai amounts not only to a general commitment to
pay in one month – analogous to the American cardholder’s general
commitment when it signs a credit-card slip that it will repay “in
accordance with the agreement with the card issuer.” The consent to
ikkai barai also includes an authorization for a transfer out of the
customer’s account to pay the transaction shortly after the last day of
the payment cycle.61 Because the cardholder at the point of purchase
already has given the issuer access to a specified amount of funds in
a specified account, the transaction resembles much more closely an
American debit-card transaction than an American credit-card
transaction.62

59

See JCB Card Rules and Regulations arts. 8, 9(1) (undated) [copy on
file with author] [hereinafter JCB Cardholder’s Agreement] (providing for
calculation of charges as of the 15th day of each month, mailing of a statement
showing those charges, and a bank transfer to pay the charges on the 10th day
of the following month).
60

See supra note 13.

61

See JCB Cardholder’s Agreement, supra note 59, art. 9(1)
(establishing payment cycles that end on the 15th day of each month, with
payments transferred on the 10th day of the succeeding month).
62

This method of paying credit-card bills is not unique to Japan. My
discussion with European students suggests that it is common in Europe as well.
That may reflect the similarity of continental Europe to Japan in that neither has
checks as a substantial consumer payment system. See supra note 13.
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After the end of each payment cycle, the issuer sends the
cardholder a statement summarizing the charges.63 Absent an
affirmative and timely objection by the cardholder, the issuer causes
the funds to be transferred from the cardholder’s bank account to the
issuer’s account on the designated date.64 When the cardholder uses
ikkai barai, there typically is no interest or other charge for the
deferral of payment from the date of the transaction to the monthly
payment date.65 Thus, the 80% (or greater) share of transactions
processed by ikkai barai involves no significant extension of credit
by the issuer. When credit is extended, the rates are relatively
modest by American standards, in the range of 12% per annum.66

63

See JCB Cardholder’s Agreement, supra note 59, art. 8 (providing
for a statement sent by ordinary mail describing all charges made by the 15th
day of each calendar month).
64

See JCB Cardholder’s Agreement, supra note 59, arts. 8, 9(1)
(authorizing a payment on the 10th day of the month if the customer does not
object within one week of the customer’s receipt of the monthly statement). In
the rare case in which the card is issued by a bank the bank might take the
funds by a simple removal of funds from the account. In the more common
case in which the card is issued by some entity that is not a bank (that is, a bank
affiliate, shinpan kaisha, or retailer-affiliated card issuer), the issuer obtains the
funds by a bank-debit transfer. See JCB Cardholder’s Agreement, supra note
59, art. 9(1) (granting permission for the bank transfer); Anonymous Interview
Two, supra note 58. The need for the issuer to obtain payment by such a
transfer means that issuers will issue cards only to consumers that have bank
accounts at institutions with which the issuer has a debit-transfer agreement.
Most issuers have such relations with several institutions, but those relations are
sufficiently limited that the need for such a relation apparently does constrain
issuers’ ability to issue cards. See Anonymous Interview Three, supra note 58.
65

See Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 58. There is nothing
unusual about the absence of interest in those transactions; it is similar to the
typical American practice, in which there is no interest charge for convenience
users that pay their bills in the entirety each month. See Zywicki, supra note
27, at 101-04 (analyzing the competitive reasons that have led the American
market to that pattern).
66

Because rates vary considerably even within a single issuer’s
portfolio, and because the pattern of rates an issuer charges is highly
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY COMPARISON OF
JAPANESE AND U.S. CREDIT -CARD USAGE

P URCHASES PER
CAPITA
SHARE OF CONSUMER
SPENDING
SHARE OF NON-CASH
P AYMENTS
MEAN TRANSACTION
AMOUNT
SHARE OF
BORROWING

U.S.

JAPAN

$3,500

$1,500

21%

5%

26%

10%

$76

$225

50%

10%

2. Explaining the Differences
The foregoing section suggests three salient differences
between Japanese and United States use of credit cards: the
transactions in Japan are less common, larger, and less often involve
significant borrowing (by which I mean borrowing that results in the
payment of interest to the card issuer). Each of those differences, I
believe, is best attributed to differences in the institutional
precursors discussed in Part I. Two of those factors are sufficiently
obvious to make extended discussion superfluous. First, Japan’s
retail economy, albeit one of the largest on the planet, is
significantly smaller than that of the United States. Thus, any
economies of scale in the deployment of information technology
would render the Japanese system marginally less effective than the
United States system. Second, it is widely recognized that Japan has

proprietary, it is difficult to generalize on that point or to provide specific data
from specific issuers. I offer the estimate in the text as a general impression
based on the interviews I conducted in Japan.
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telecommunication costs that are among the highest of any
developed nation. Both of those factors contribute to higher costs
that should make the systems less competitive than their
counterparts in the United States.
In my view, however, the costs that plausibly can be attributed
to those factors cannot explain the identified differences: the limited
usage of cards, the large size of the transactions, or the limited
amount of borrowing. To the extent institutional factors can explain
those differences, the limited powers of Japanese banks is the best
explanation. Accordingly, I defer discussion of the relevance of
telecommunication costs and economies of scale to the next
section.67 In this section I compare the explanatory power of the
disempowered-bank hypothesis to several potential alternate
explanations.
(a) The Disempowered-Bank Hypothesis
In comparing the power of various potential explanations, I am
influenced strongly by data suggesting that credit-card use in Japan
over the last several years has displayed a marked convergence with
the American pattern of usage on each of the axes of difference
discussed above. First, Japanese use of credit cards almost doubled
between 1994 and 1998 (from 362.8 million transactions to 720.7
million transactions).68
Second, because the amount of the
transactions rose by only about 40% (from ¥12.5 trillion ($110
billion) to ¥17.8 trillion ($160 billion), the average transaction
decreased by about 28% (from almost ¥34,500 ($315) to just under
¥25,000 ($225)).69 Third, the gross amount of borrowing is
increasing rapidly (by 28% in the last four years).70 Also, the share
67

See infra section II(B).

68

See BIS, 1998 Payments Statistics, supra note 57, at 56 (tbl. 12).

69

See BIS, 1998 Payments Statistics, supra note 57, at 56 (tbl. 13).

70

See JCIA ANNUAL STATISTICS, supra note 57, at 49-50 (comparing
1994 to 1998). For comparison, the total amount of kappu from 1990 to 1994
actually decreased slightly, before beginning to rise in 1994, as bank participation
began to have a significant effect on the market.
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of borrowing transactions (“kappu”) among bank-affiliated creditcard transactions is growing with particular rapidity (by 120% in the
last four years).71
It would be imprudent to give dispositive weight to evidence
of a macroeconomic trend appearing over such a short period of time
– less than an entire economic cycle – but the significant rates of
change on all three parameters certainly suggest that something has
happened during the last decade that has mitigated the force of
whatever factors have led to the striking differences between the U.S.
and Japanese credit-card markets. The most obvious candidate is the
one discussed above, the general opening of the credit-card market
to bank-affiliated issuers in 1992.72
One way to look at the Japanese card market – with its ikkai
barai-dominated payment structure – is to view it as just starting to
move beyond the payment cards that populated the American market
in the 1950’s and 1960’s. It is not a coincidence that the credit card
first introduced in Japan (in 1960)73 is said to have been modeled

71

See JCIA ANNUAL STATISTICS, supra note 57, at 49-50. Because
revolving credit is the only form of kappu currently permitted to bank-affiliated
issuers, see supra note 58, all of those transactions must be revolving credit.
That trend seems to be continuing. One large Japanese bank-affiliated creditcard issuer reported an increase of the share of revolving-credit value in its
portfolio of 13.6% from 1998 to 1999 alone. See Anonymous Interview Four,
supra note 58. Another bank-affiliated issuer emphasized that revolving-credit
usage is particularly increasing among its younger card users. See Anonymous
Interview Six, Tokyo (Oct. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Anonymous Interview Six].
72

To be sure, the rates of change are quite slow, and borrowing is still
less common on bank credit cards than it is on the credit cards of other
consumer lenders. But that seems fairly attributable to the complexity of
experience involved in a successful credit-card operation, experience that it took
decades for American lenders and Japanese lenders to acquire. See supra
note 31.
73

See CREDIT TRANSACTION GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 108
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directly on the American Express and Diner’s Club payment cards.74
Without banks in the marketplace, the industry has for the most part
been static since that time: the products available to consumers have
not been sufficiently attractive to produce the consumer
receptiveness to borrowing evident from the United States
transaction data.75 Thus, Japanese banks have quite a respectable
market share of credit-card transactions (about 49%) of Japanese
credit-card shopping.76 But the share of borrowing transactions was
much smaller: bank-affiliated issuers had only 13% of the extended
borrowing (“kappu”) done by credit cards.77
The most obvious explanation for those poor results is the
general lack of success of revolving credit: the product on which

74

See CREDIT TRANSACTION GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 108;
Anonymous Interview Three, supra note 58.
75

The limited success of banks in the credit-card system surely is
related not only to the particular limitations on credit-card activities, but also in a
general way to the limited attention that banks in Japan have devoted to
consumer finance. See STEPHEN M. HARMER, JAPAN’S FINANCIAL
REVOLUTION AND HOW AMERICAN FIRMS ARE P ROFITING 37 (2000)
(“[W]hile banks in the United States quickly reoriented themselves to the
consumer finance market when corporate lending spreads narrowed, Japanese
banks never made the transition.”). Even now, notwithstanding the financial
pressures that have confronted the Japanese banking industry in the late 1990’s,
it is not clear that Japanese banks have turned whole-heartedly to consumer
finance. See HARMER, supra, at 40-41, 126, 136. It is possible, of course, that
the limited interest of banks in consumer finance is attributable to the regulatory
hurdles that in past decades hindered bank participation in the industry. One
Japanese reader also suggested to methat Japanese banks continue to worry
about adverse reputational effects that they would suffer if they became
involved in the vigorous collection efforts and high interest rates that are typical
of successful consumer lending.
76

See JCIA ANNUAL STATISTICS, supra note 57, at 68. Retailers
generally account for another 29% and shinpan kaisha for 17%. See id.
77

See JCIA ANNUAL STATISTICS, supra note 57, at 49-50.
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American banks have built their large credit-card receivables.78 At
least part of the answer must be the relatively unattractive features of
that product as it exists in Japan. Specifically, “revolving” credit in
Japan does not permit the freely chosen, month-to-month varying
payments typical of the American cardholder. Rather, the cardholder
agrees, at the time that the card is issued, that any transactions
designated as “revolving” will be paid back over a prearranged
schedule (perhaps 10% per month, perhaps 10,000 yen per month).79
And the designation of the transactions as revolving generally must
occur at the cash register – with an admission to the sales clerk that
the cardholder does not plan to pay for the purchase out of current
income.80 Many of my interviews suggested a practical explanation
for the cumbersome design; executives argued that it is much less
practical for the check-less Japanese cardholder to make the oddamount monthly payments than it is for the American cardholder that
normally pays by check.81 Given the frequency with which Japanese
consumers pay other bills by means of bank transfers, that
explanation seems most implausible – there is no obvious reason
they could not pay credit-card bills in the same way.82 But the
78

See supra note 58 (estimating revolving credit in the Japanese creditcard market).
79

See CREDIT TRANSACTION GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 6493
(describing the typical schedules for repayment of revolving credit from JCB);
Anonymous Interview Three, supra note 58.
80

The distinction on that point from American practice seems crucial.
See MANNING, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing how the “magic of plastic” allows
American consumers to “shelter Americans from the social cost of
borrowing”).
81

See Anonymous Interview Four, supra note 58; Anonymous
Interview Five, supra note 58. The plausibility of that explanation as a
causative force is undermined by the recent introduction of a conventional
revolving-credit product in Japan that does permit consumers free choice of
their monthly payment amounts. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
82

Unlike American consumers, Japanese consumers easily can initiate
bank transfers directly from ATM machines or, for large payees like utility
companies, even from convenience stores. For statistics on the high use of
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plausibility of the explanation is less important than the facts of the
market: the so-called revolving credit traditionally offered to
Japanese consumers is not nearly as convenient as the product
available in the United States.
Still, it is difficult to understand why the non-bank players in
the credit-card industry have not stepped into the void to provide the
seductive products that American banks have designed to facilitate
the profitable extension of so much consumer credit in the United
States. It is clear that the major players are aware of the profitability
of revolving credit; most of them have simply failed in their efforts
to persuade their customers to use it.83 My best answer is the one
suggested above, that banks are best-placed to develop credit-card
products that facilitate large amounts of borrowing. The exclusion
of banks from the Japanese market during the period that those
products were developed in the United States – when depositary
relations seemed to be crucial to successful credit-card issuance –
stifled development of those products until the last few years.
The plausibility of that analysis is bolstered by a significant
recent innovation in the Japanese credit-card market: the 1999

bank transfers, see JAPANESE BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 13, at 3
(data indicating that bank transfers are used for 85% of non-cash payments in
Japan). My sense that the explanation is implausible is bolstered by the recent
introduction of a conventional revolving-credit product in Japan that does permit
consumers free choice of their monthly payment amounts. See infra notes 8589 and accompanying text.
83

See KUREJITTO SANGYÔ HAKUSHO [White Paper on Credit
Industry], GEKKAN SHÔHISHA SHINYÔ [CONSUMER CREDIT MONTHLY],
2000-9, at 12, 14-15 [hereinafter Credit Industry White Paper] (discussing
efforts of banks to increase the amount of revolving credit). I asked executives
at more than one interview why – if they want their consumers to use revolving
credit – the default repayment option for Japanese credit cards is ikkai barai
rather than revolving credit. The most cogent explanation was that so many of
their cardholders so clearly want ikkai barai that they expected that they would
face a serious adverse market reaction if their cards had anything other than
ikkai barai as the default repayment option. See Anonymous Interview Two,
supra note 58.
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introduction by at least one consumer-finance company of a credit
card that offers the type of revolving credit that has been so
successful in the United States.84 Such a card permits consumers to
select their repayment schedule not at the time of purchase, but at
the end of each billing cycle when they make a payment.85 The
identity of the issuer – a consumer finance company not affiliated
with any depositary institution – suggests that the same
developments in information technology that foster successful
credit-card lending by American monoline banks – with no
depositary relations with their customers – have shown the way to
similar products in Japan.86
As you would expect based on the American market
experience, the product seems to be successful, at least initially, in
attracting customers; the company has issued more than 500,000
cards in the first 18 months of the program (more than a third of
them to customers with no previous relationship with the lender).87
For present purposes, the most important thing about the program is
that those customers are selecting revolving credit for a staggering
(for Japan) 91% of their purchases.88 The company’s underwriting
84

See HARMER, supra note 75, at 135-36 (discussing such a card).

85

Some other issuers have used online connections to permit their
customers an intermediate degree of flexibility, under which customers that
have selected ikkai barai at the time of the transaction can go to the issuer’s
website and change the designation of any particular transaction to revolving
credit. See http://sumitomovisa.co.jp/carduse/atoribo.html (Sumitomo Credit);
http://home3.americanexpress.com/japan/blue/flex/flex_pay.html
(American
Express). Although that might have much the same practical effect, it is still
relatively cumbersome.
86

See supra notes 32-37 (suggesting that depositary relations are
irrelevant to the successful marketing of modern credit-card products); see also
Naomi Tanaka, Toyota Cruises into Consumer Finance, NIKKEI WEEKLY,
Feb. 26, 2001, at 14 (discussing plans for Toyota to issue a credit card starting in
April of 2001).
87

See Anonymous Interview One, supra note 58.

88

See Anonymous Interview One, supra note 58.
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appears to rely heavily on a credit-scoring model, an approach that
seems to resemble closely the models used by American issuers.89
The use of that technology is particularly surprising given the
relatively limited availability in the Japanese consumer-finance
industry of consumer financial information.90

89

See Anonymous Interview One, supra note 58.

90

It is difficult to understand exactly what kinds of information are
available to consumer lenders in Japan, but it is clear that general statistical use
of the information is not as common in Japan as it is in America. For example,
the largest consumer credit-reporting service in Japan reports that as of 1998 it
had less than 70 million entries and that it received less than 20 million requests
for information during 1998. See Personal Credit Information Center <http://
www.zenginkyo.or.jp/en/pcic/pcic.htm> (visited Nov. 13, 2000). One likely
reason for the limited information is that lenders must have the customer’s
consent to submit information to that center. See id.
Efforts to rely on the kind of credit-scoring models that American card
issuers use are hampered by the limited willingness of the consumer-lending
industry as a whole to share information. It appears that information generally
is shared only within each sector (consumer-finance companies, shinpan kaisha,
and banks). The only information that currently is shared industrywide is
information about specific defaults. See id. Plans for more complete sharing of
information are ongoing. See Kokyaku Shinyô Jyôhô 12gatsu Kaihô
[Consumer Credit Reports of Consumer Credit Companies Will Be Open to
Shinpan and Bank-affiliated Companies in December], NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, Oct. 26, 2000, at 1. On the other hand, the government at the same
time is likely in the near future to enact privacy legislation that would restrict
information sharing. See W.A. Lee, U.S. Banks Urged to Meet E.U. Data
Rules, AM . BANKER, Oct. 24, 2000, at 1, 10 (reporting Japanese promulgation
of a draft privacy directive similar to the European directive); Jyôhô Tsûshin
Senryaku Honbu [Committee on IT Strategy Headquarters], Kojin Jyôhô
Kihon Hôsei ni Kansuru Taik ô [Consulting Report on Protecting Privacy]
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/it/privacy/houseika/taikouan/1011taikou. html> (Oct.
11, 2000) (discussing plans to enact Kojin Jyôhô Kihonhô [Law Regarding the
Protection of Privacy]). Given the relatively limited availability of information, it
is impossible at this point to evaluate the effectiveness of that particular creditscoring model: if it is properly designed, it would be a bold stroke of
technological expertise; if not, it could be a cover that supports excessively risky
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All in all, the result is a market into which credit cards have
made relatively little headway and – which is much the same thing in
a retail economy without checks – in which cash payment is
unusually dominant. Thus, from that perspective it is easy to see why
the average credit-card transaction in Japan is so much larger than
(about three times as large as) the average United States credit-card
transaction. If we assume that the retail economies of the two
countries have reasonably similar sets of transactions of different
sizes, and assume that Japanese credit cards are not – as a relative
matter – as attractive to Japanese consumers as American credit
cards are to American consumers, then we would expect to observe
larger credit-card transactions in Japan than we do in the United
States. Essentially, Japanese consumers are much more willing to
carry larger amounts of cash, which they use to pay for larger
transactions, than American consumers. American consumers, on
the other hand, are much more willing to use credit cards for smaller
transactions, for which Japanese consumers would use cash.91
In sum, the the disempowered-bank hypothesis is consistent
with both the structure of the current market and the changes that
seem to be occurring in that market. That at least suggests that bank
powers are in some way causally related to that market. It remains to
examine other potential explanations.
(b) Other Explanations
CAUTIOUS CONSUMERS.—The most obvious alternate
explanation is the simplest, but also the least satisfying: Japanese
cardholders by nature are more cautious, and averse to borrowing,
than American consumers. Thus, you might think that it is natural
that they should use credit less. That habit could be connected to the
substantial literature attempting to explain what seems to be the

lending. Only the vagaries of a downturn in economic growth can provide a
definitive assessment.
91

See supra note 15 (discussing survey results regarding the amount of
cash typically carried by Japanese).
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higher predilection to save of the individual Japanese consumer.92
From that perspective, the other side of a higher predilection for
savings would be a lower tendency to use consumer credit. That
tendency also might be supported by the historically ungenerous
provisions of the Japanese consumer bankruptcy system (which
might deter consumer borrowing) or by the relatively undeveloped
credit-bureau system93 (which might deter consumer lending).
That theory has several salient empirical difficulties. The
first is the empirical fact that the size Japanese consumer-credit
market does not in fact support the notion that Japanese consumers
have a significantly higher aversion to borrowing. Indeed, if
anything, the Japanese market is slightly larger per capita than the
American consumer credit market. The American consumer credit
market is now in the range of $1.2 trillion (about $4,400 per
capita).94 The Japanese market seems to be about ¥76 trillion (about

92

The American rate for some time hovered around 10%, but in recent
years has sunk quite low, arguably near zero. See MANNING, supra note 7, at
31, 100, 321 n.1, 337 n.3 (reporting a net savings rate during 1998 of 0.5%).
Data from different sources report widely varying rates of savings in Japan.
Compare Yoshikazu Yada & Haruki Hirano, Statistics on Personal Savings
Tell Half the Story: Despite Statistics, Most People Aren’t That Rich, ASAHI
SHIMBUN,
Aug.
10,
2000,
available
at
http://www.asahi.com/english/asahi/0810/asahi081002.html (visited Aug. 11,
2000) (reporting that Japanese working households save about 28.5% of their
income (up from 20.9% in 1983), with Sheldon Garon, Fashioning a Culture
of Thrift: Promoting Saving in Twentieth-Century Japan (unpublished 2000
manuscript) (reporting that the Japanese rate has leveled off around 13
percent). All reports indicate, however, that the rate is higher in Japan than it is
in the United States.
93
94

See supra note 90 (discussing that system).

See Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.19 (Consumer Credit)
(Jan.
8,
2001),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G19/Current/g19.pdf;
SULLIVAN,
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 6, at 258.
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$5,500 per person).95 Thus, although it seems plausible that there
are distinctively Japanese cultural constraints on consumer
borrowing, it is not at all clear to me that those constraints operate
any more effectively than the analogous American constraints.96
Another problem is that it is not at all clear that the Japanese
consumer-bankruptcy system is harsher in any cognizable way than
the American system.97 As a practical matter, Japanese consumer
bankruptcy grants a discharge in a relatively routine manner.
Moreover, whatever the social stigma of bankruptcy might be,
resistance to bankruptcy seems to be falling in Japan, where about
one tenth of one percent of the populace filed for bankruptcy in
1999.98 Although that is still much lower than the American rate of
about one half of one percent, it has been growing over the last
decade so rapidly that it is difficult to be sure that the difference
means much.99

95

JCIA ANNUAL STATISTICS, supra note 57, at 30; see also
Alexander, supra note 22, at 6 (presenting data illustrating that Japan since
1990 has had a higher ratio of consumer credit to disposable income than the
United States).
96

For discussion of the condemnation American culture holds for those
who rely on borrowing to support spending beyond their income, see MANNING,
supra note 7, at 2-3 (discussing the “nonmonetary price of debt”).
97

For information on the Japanese consumer bankruptcy system, I an
grateful to Professor Kent Anderson at Hokkaido University.
98

I base that estimate on data collected by Kent Anderson from the
Supreme Court of Japan. See e-mail from Kent Anderson, Associate
Professor, Hokkaido University, School of Law (Feb. 16, 2001) [copy on file
with author] (reporting 124,000 consumer bankruptcies in Japan in 1999, after a
more than ten-fold increase during the 1990’s).
99

See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Bankruptcy
Filings Down in Calendar Year 2000 (Feb. 23, 2001 news release) [copy on file
with author] (reporting 1.2 million personal bankruptcies in the United States
during 2000); Nicole Duran, Consumers Slam Bankruptcy Bill, AM . BANKER,
Feb. 28, 2001, at 4, 2001 WL 3909819 (same). The American rate also has
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The basic problem is that statistics about the savings rate – the
ratio of overall savings to overall consumption – have no necessary
relation to the number of people who borrow or to the amount that
they borrow. Thus, it would be entirely possible for Japan to have a
higher savings rate because a higher percentage of its people save
more, but still to have a similar amount of average consumer credit.
For example, that could be true if either a higher percentage of
Japanese non-savers use substantial amounts of consumer credit or if
those Japanese non-savers who do use consumer credit use (on the
average) more than the borrowers in the United States. I have not
located any data that is sufficiently specific to describe the pattern
precisely, but for purposes of my topic the generally similar amounts
of consumer borrowing per capita make me skeptical of any heavy
reliance on a Japanese aversion to borrowing.
Although those empirical difficulties strike me as powerful, it
doubtless would be an exaggeration to deny the existence of a
Japanese preference for savings. Even as a theoretical matter,
however, it is difficult to grant that phenomenon a causative effect on
Japanese credit-card usage. First, although some scholars think that
the higher savings rate reflects a special aspect of the Japanese
personality,100 others attribute it to other institutional features of the
Japanese economy. For example, some scholars think the higher rate

been dropping for the last few years, which also undermines any effort to put
great significance in the difference between that rate and the Japanese rate.
100

And not necessarily a native aspect of the personality. See
SHELDON GARON, THE STATE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 153-57, 171-77 (1997)
(discussing government efforts to popularize thrift and savings in Japan after
World War II); Sheldon Garon, Luxury Is the Enemy: Mobilizing Savings and
Popularizing Thrift in Wartime Japan, 26 J . JAPANESE STUD. 41 (2000)
(discussing government efforts to popularize thrift and savings in Japan during
World War II); Garon, supra note 92 (arguing that high Japanese savings rates
are caused by more than a century of vigorous government efforts to inculcate
a “culture of thrift”); Charles Yuji Horioka, Comments on “Fashioning a
Culture of Thrift: Promoting Savings in Japan and the World (unpublished
2000 manuscript) [copy on file with author] (discussing empirical research
indicating that savings education alters the habits of those subjected to it).
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of savings is caused by the Japanese system for intergenerational
transfers of wealth,101 while others view it (even now) as an artifact
of Japan’s stage of industrial development.102 Although those
explanations would explain a lower rate of consumer spending, they
provide much less direct support for the lower rate of consumer
borrowing that appears in the credit-card market. Specifically, they
provide little support for the specific observation in question: a
lower rate of borrowing in those transactions in which consumers
choose to purchase by credit card.103
Thus, notwithstanding the strong evidence that Japanese
consumers save more than American consumers, my general
impression is that the consumer credit market as a whole is
approximately as attractive to consumers as the analogous market in
the United States. The culture of each country includes strands that
strongly condemn excessive borrowing, but in each country the
consumer-credit industry in the last few decades has broken through
those constraints to create about $5000 per person in borrowing.
While a good deal of work has been done to explain how that was
done in the United States,104 I am not aware of similar scholarship
101

For a thorough but ultimately inconclusive attempt to explain that
phenomenon, see FUMIO HAYASHI, UNDERSTANDING SAVINGS ch. 11 (1997).
102

Richard Katz argues that consumers in the aggregate save more at
earlier stages of Japanese development and thus that the post-WWII data
suggesting higher savings by Japanese consumers is caused by Japan’s place at
an earlier stage in the development process during those years. See KATZ ,
supra note 42, at 141-42, 199-206.
103

Assuming that the return on saved assets is less than the interest
charges associated with consumer borrowing, it is arguably irrational for
consumers with savings to borrow. Thus, the higher rate of savings in Japan
might support a lower rate of borrowing – because fewer individuals would
rationally borrow. It seems clear, however, that in both countries individuals
with savings do borrow despite the interest charges that could be avoided by
liquidating saved assets. Thus, that explanation seems incomplete.
104

See, e.g., MANNING, supra note 7, at 101-24 (discussing the
“cognitive connect” between income and current spending, and how its force
diminished during the passage of the 20th century).
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explaining the inconsistency between the widely noted Japanesese
aversion to borrowing and the statistics showing an American-style
level of consumer debt. But, whatever the cause, it is apparent that
there is a great deal of consumer credit in Japan and that very little of
it involves credit cards. Thus, the question remains, why, within that
market, do consumers use credit cards for such a small share of
borrowing. As I explain above, I think that institutional factors
peculiar to the Japanese market provide a plausible answer to that
question.
LIMITED
CONSUMER-PROTECTION
LAWS .—Another
possibility is that the limited success of the credit card derives from
the relatively limited protection Japanese law provides Japanese
credit-cardholders. Most obviously, Japan has no analogue to TILA §
170, which generally preserves the right of American cardholders to
present against the issuer any defense to payment that they would
have against the merchant.105 The parallel Japanese statute at first
glance seems to provide the same protection, but it is limited to
transactions that involve extended borrowing (kappu).106 Because
those transactions are a relatively small share of the Japanese creditcard industry,107 that provision has little impact. For comparison,
notice that the TILA provision applies until the bill is repaid, even if
it happens that the bill is paid during the first billing cycle.108
Because those laws are much less protective than American laws,
Japanese consumers might fear losses that they would incur if they
carry or use credit cards.

105

See generally MANN, supra note 2, at 125-38 (discussing those
protections).
106

Articles 30-4 & 30-5 of the Installment Sales Law of 1961, KAPPU
HANBAIHÔ [Installment Sales Law], Law No. 159 of 1961; see also supra
note 58 (discussing the definition of “kappu”).
107

About 12.7% of 1998 transaction value.
STATISTICS, supra note 57, at 64.
108

See JCIA ANNUAL

See TILA § 170(a); MANN, supra note 2, at 118 (discussing that
aspect of TILA).
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Again, because there has been no significant change in those
laws in the last decade, the legal differences cannot explain the
observed pattern.109 More broadly, however, my impressions based
on American experience with such protections make me doubt that
the difference in formal legal rules can have much significance. In
the United States, we see that American consumers are so unfamiliar
with the protection that it is unlikely to be a significant motivation in
their willingness to use credit cards.110 Furthermore, even if
Japanese cardholders were aware of the limited formal statutory
protection, it seems unlikely that they would be troubled, because
informal government pressure has resulted in a system in which card
issuers provide insurance that covers substantially all of the risk of
loss from unauthorized transactions.111
* * * * * * *
To summarize, it may be that some part of the difference in
the use of credit in credit-card transactions arises from a Japanese
“distaste” for borrowing, or from fear of losses from stolen cards,
but those factors cannot explain the changes in the market that have

109

For minor revisions in 1999, see Hômon Hanbai tô Kansuru Hôritsu
Oyobi Kappu Hanbaihô no Ichibu wo Kaisei Suru Hôritsu [Law Amending
Door-to-Door and Other Direct Sales Law and Installment Sales Law], Law
No. 34 of 1999 (broadening the coverage of the protection in minor respects);
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Outline of Amendment to Door-toDoor Sales and Other Direct Sales Law and Installment Sales Law (Draft)
(Mar. 4, 1999) <http://www.miti.go.jp/english/report/data/gCD1101e.html>
(describing the purpose of the revisions).
110

See Telephone Interview with Michael Butts, CreditCard.com (Oct.
15, 1999) (transcript at 1) [transcript on file with author] (discussing rarity of
claims under TILA § 170); Telephone Interview with Steven Klebe, Vice
President, Payment Industry Alliances, CyberSource Corporation (Oct. 19,
1999) [hereinafter Klebe Interview] [transcript on file with author] (transcript at
6) (same).
111

See infra note 119 (discussing the insurance).
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occurred during recent years.112 Those changes are best explained by
changes in the institutional framework within which the card has
developed, and in which it is used.
B. The Costs of the System
The previous section contends that the principal reason that
the Japanese credit-card industry looks so different from the U.S.
one is that the exclusion of banks from the market hindered the
development of products that would attract consumer use and
borrowing. The system also has been hindered in a subsidiary way,
by higher costs, which make the system less attractive to the
merchants and cardholders that bear a significant portion of those
costs. The most obvious source of those costs is in the losses from
fraud, which seem to be significantly higher in Japan than they are in
the United States. The most obvious evidence of the significance of
those costs would be in the higher discount rates and cardholder fees
charged in the Japanese system. This section considers those topics
in turn.
1.

Fraud Rates

Surely one of the most important metrics of the effectiveness
of a payment system is reliability: how well does it prevent
unauthorized transactions? On that point, the raw data suggests that
Japan has a problem. Specifically, the fraud rate in the United States
is about 0.06% (six cents per $100).113 In Japan, by contrast, the

112

One change that has occurred in recent years is the increased
concentration of the retail-store market. I do believe that supports the growth
of the credit-card market, but its effect seems to be much smaller than the
effect of bank participation. For discussion of that effect, see infra note 152.
113

See Card Fraud in the U.S. – 1999, NILSON REPORT , June 2000
(Issue 718) [hereinafter 1999 US Fraud Data], at 1, 4.
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fraud rate is much higher, about 0.13 yen per 100 yen.114 Looking
specifically to losses from forged cards, the Japanese rate of about
4.3 basis points is about three times the American rate of 1.3 basis
points.115
One possibility I initially considered was that the high fraud is
associated with the diminished statutory incentive for Japanese card
issuers to prevent unauthorized transactions. Under the Truth-inLending Act, American issuers are barred by law from shifting the
risk of unauthorized transactions to their cardholders116; Japanese
issuers face no such constraint.117 It is possible, then, that the
difference in legal treatment could lead to a lower level of care by

114

See Kurejitto Ka-do Fusei Shiyô Higai no Hassei Jyôkyô
[Statistics on Losses from Unauthorized Credit-Card Transactions in
Japan], GEKKAN SHÔHISHA SHINYÔ [CONSUMER CREDIT MONTHLY], 2000-5,
at 7, 7 [hereinafter Japanese Credit-Card Fraud Data]. That rate is
calculated based on ¥20.76 trillion of transactions for 1999. See supra note 55
and accompanying text.
115

The Japanese rate is calculated based on ¥9 billion of forged credit
card losses, divided by the total ¥20.76 trillion of transactions for 1999, see
supra note 55 and accompanying text. The American rate is calculated from
1999 US Fraud Data, supra note 113, at 4, including losses from skimming,
altered cards, and new counterfeit cards.
116

Truth-in-Lending Act § 133, 15 U.S.C. § 1643. That statute permits
issuers to impose $50 of liability on cardholders, but Visa and MasterCard both
have generally agreed that their issuers will waive the right to pass that loss to
the cardholders. See Lisa Fickensher, Visa Shores up Web Position, Ends
Fees on Theft of Card Numbers, AM . BANKER, Feb. 22, 2000, at 1, 14 (Visa
policy); <http://www.mastercard.com/ourcards/zeroliability.html> (MasterCard
policy); see also RITZER, supra note 33, at 101 (“[C]redit card companies
rarely assess a fraud victim for even that sum [i.e., the $50 permitted by the
Truth-in-Lending Act].”).
117

See Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 58; Anonymous
Interview Three, supra note 58; Anonymous Interview Six, supra note 71.

3/22/2001 Draft U.S.& JAPANESE CREDIT AND DEBIT CARDS

43

the card issuer.118 On reflection, however, that explanation does not
seem plausible. For one thing, Japanese issuers in practice retain the
risk of unauthorized transactions, because they purchase insurance
for much of that risk and voluntarily cover most of the losses that the
insurance does not cover.119 Because they purchase that insurance
from third-party insurers,120 it is fair to expect that the rates that they
pay in the long run are affected substantially by their performance.
Thus, it is at least plausible to think that Japanese card-issuers have a
significant incentive to reduce fraud losses.

118

See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and
Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181 (1996) (discussing the
effects of increased liability for issuers and consumers).
119

To be sure, the third-party insurance does not cover all types of
unauthorized transactions. See Takayoshi Suefuji, Kurejitto Kâdo Nyûmon
[INTRODUCTION TO CREDIT CARDS], GEKKAN SHÔHISHA SHINYÔ
[CONSUMER CREDIT MONTHLY], 2000-8, at 74, 75 (describing insurance limited
to theft and loss of the card). Moreover, it is limited to unauthorized
transactions that occur no more than 60 days before, and no more than 60 days
after, the cardholder advises the issuer of the loss. See id. It is possible that a
few losses occur outside that window, especially if cardholders fail to examine
their statements. Like the $50 limit discussed in note 116 supra, however, those
limitations seem to be widely ignored. Specifically, my interviews strongly
suggest that issuers commonly cover losses whether the losses are covered by
the insurance or not. The sole exception seems to be in cases in which the
cardholder was seriously negligent in losing the card; even that possibility seems
not to be commonly applied. See Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 58;
Anonymous Interview Three, supra note 58; Anonymous Interview Six, supra
note 71. It appears that the issuers’ common willingness to cover transactions
without regard to the precise boundaries of the insurance coverage is related at
least in part to administrative guidance from MITI, which has suggested to
credit-card issuers that the insurance typically provided is not adequate to
provide appropriate protection to consumers. Kâdo no Anzensei no Kakuho ni
Tsuite [To Ensure the Security of Credit Cards] (guidance sent from MITI to
the Japan Consumer Credit Industry Association on July 31, 1979).
120

The issuers normally purchase the insurance from third-party
providers, but sometimes they self-insure. See Anonymous Interview Two,
supra note 58; Anonymous Interview Three, supra note 58.
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Moreover, it is clear that the fraud rates in both countries are
not stable, as you would expect if the rates were associated with
longstanding differences in the legal framework. In the United
States, for example, the fraud rate has fallen by more than half in the
last decade.121 Similarly, the fraud problem in Japan is relatively
recent; fraud losses in 1999 were 45% higher than they were just two
years earlier in 1997, with 94% of the increase attributable to losses
from forged cards.122
It is more plausible to attribute the losses to exploitation of
technical vulnerabilities in the Japanese system.123 Most obviously,
the Japanese system uses contemporaneous telephone authorizations
much less frequently than the American system,124 apparently
121

See 1999 US Fraud Data, supra note 113, at 1, 4 (reporting drop
in fraud losses from 16.1 cents to 6.0 cents per $100).
122

See Japanese Credit-Card Fraud Data, supra note 114, at 12.

123

The Japanese government apparently attributes the fraud losses to
lax criminal laws and is responding in several ways. See Lax Laws Made
Japan Card-Forgery Haven, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Apr. 24, 2000, at 4 (reporting
plans to criminalize skimming and the possession of forged cards); Govt to
Crack down on Credit Card Crimes, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, June 16, 2000
(same); NPA Targets Credit Card Fraud, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 6, 2000,
available at http://www.newsonjapan.com (reporting plans for the National
Police Agency to develop a system for analyzing fake credit cards to identify
and locate professional card counterfeiters). As the discussion in the text
suggests, I am skeptical of the significance of those legal problems.
124

See Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 58. The details about
the use of contemporaneous authorizations are difficult to discern, because I
received directly inconsistent explanations in several of my interviews. Those
explanations convince me, at a minimum, that contemporaneous authorizations
are not as ubiquitous in Japan as they are in the United States. See supra note
39 and accompanying text (reporting 95% authorization rates for United States
transactions). As a rule of thumb, it appears that until very recently many
merchants were not doing contemporaneous on-line authorizations for
transactions below ¥10,000 (about $90 dollars). See Anonymous Interview
One, supra note 58; Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 58; Anonymous
Interview Four, supra note 58; Anonymous Interview Five, supra note 58.
That ¥10,000 limit itself was implemented only in 1999, before which that floor
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because
of
the
relatively
high
cost
of
Japanese
125
telecommunications.
Without those authorizations, the potential
for fraud is much higher, because the system has no practical way to
identify a card that bears a valid number, even if the magnetic stripe
fails to include the information that would appear on a legitimate
card.126
But it is most implausible to regard that difficulty as a
permanent feature of the system. It is unlikely that Japanese issuers
and merchants will tolerate for long substantial losses from fraud
that easily could be eradicated by simple authorization procedures
that are standard operating practice in the United States. Thus, it is
not surprising that the industry already is implementing responses
that target that problem: industry sources explain that as of late 2000

had been ¥30,000. Moreover, for several categories of merchants (such as
hotels, airports, and hospitals), the floors historically have been much higher, in
the range of ¥180,000-300,000. See Anonymous Interview Five, supra note
58. One large bank-card issuer told me that about 30% of its transactions are
not authorized because they fall below the floors. See Anonymous Interview
Five, supra note 58.
125

Those high costs contribute to the high floors by making it difficult to
persuade merchants to accept the costs of more frequent authorizations
associated with lower floors. Although my interviews produced conflicting
views on the point, more than one source argued that high telecommunication
costs also contribute to a persistent merchant practice of failing to authorize
transactions above the floors (that is, transactions for which authorization is
required by the merchant’s agreement with the credit-card issuer). The
interviews attribute that practice to the (not entirely implausible) view of the
merchant that the cost of the authorization exceeds the potential fraud savings
from the authorization. See Anonymous Interview Five, supra note 58;
Anonymous Interview Seven, Tokyo (Oct. 16, 2000) [hereinafter Anonymous
Interview Seven]. For example, if the telephone call costs 25 yen on a 10,000
yen transaction, it would make sense to call only if the likelihood of fraud was
.25 percent, almost twice the typical Japanese fraud rate of 0.13 percent. See
supra note 114.
126

See MANN, supra note 2, at 113-14 (discussing the importance of
contemporaneous transaction authorization).
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or 2001 most department stores127 and hotels in Japan will process
transactions without any floor at all – seeking online authorizations
for all transactions regardless of size.128 Another response that
seems to be appearing in the market already is an increasing tendency
for large store-related issuers to adopt the Visa and MasterCard

127

The rapid change is evident from anecdotal discussions of
department stores in my interviews. Several different interview subjects
reported to me the view that the rise in fraud was attributable generally to the
vulnerability of Japanese department stores, specifically to their general failure
to conduct sufficiently frequent telephone authorizations. Many observers
believe that organized crime targeted department stores because of that
vulnerability. The most reliable data I have found, however, suggests that
department stores during 1999 in fact were relatively impervious to fraud. In
the portfolio of one large credit-card issuer, department-store transactions
accounted for less than 10% of 1999 fraud, although those transactions
generally are 20-25% of volume. If there is a problem sector, it clearly is the
electronics shop, which accounted for about 20% of 1999 fraud in the portfolio
of that issuer and (based on mid-year statistics), about 33% of 2000 fraud in the
portfolio of that issuer. See Anonymous Interview Four, supra note 58; see
also Anonymous Interview Five, supra note 58 (suggesting that problems with
department stores are being solved). Smaller, but less tractable, problems are in
the gasoline and highway-toll sectors, for which it is not thought economically
practicable to have authorization terminals at each payment location. See
Anonymous Interview Six, supra note 119 (discussing problems at gasoline
stations and highway-toll facilities); Anonymous Interview Four, supra note 58
(reporting that 10% of fraud in one large credit-card portfolio occurs at gasoline
stations).
128

See Anonymous Interview Seven, supra note 125.

3/22/2001 Draft U.S.& JAPANESE CREDIT AND DEBIT CARDS

47

brands.129 Use of those brands gives the issuers access to all of the
anti-fraud technology that has been effective in the United States.130
But advances in anti-fraud technology cannot solve the
problem entirely. Even contemporaneous authorizations are to some
degree vulnerable to sophisticated cards created by skimmers (who
obtain not only the card-account number, but also the other
information on the magnetic stripe of the legitimate card). The only
existing defense against those cards is the relatively vulnerable
capacity of issuer-based expert computer systems to detect
questionable patterns in the usage of cards.131 And to some degree
Japan’s high fraud rate is caused by two unfortunate features that
make it a likely target for such attacks: the high telecommunication
costs that continue to deter merchants from consistent authorization
of transactions 132 and its proximity to the locations where the most

129

See Anonymous Interview Three, supra note 58. My particular
emphasis on the activity of department stores is supported by brochures that I
collected from department stores in Tokyo in the fall of 2000. Those brochures
included, among others, Credit Saison (the largest store-related card issuer in
Japan and the third largest issuer overall) and Mitsukoshi, one of the oldest and
most prestigious Japanese department stores. Although it would have been
valuable to my research, I was unable to interview a card executive at a
Japanese department store.
130

For example, my anecdotal impression (based on examining cards
while I have been in Japan) is that many cards issued by indigenous Japanese
issuers do not include the indented printing and multi-color signature tape that
hinder forgery of standard Visa and MasterCard products. Japanese-issued
Visa and MasterCard products in those respects are (at least to the naked eye)
indistinguishable from the American products.
131

See MANN, supra note 2, at 111-12. But cf. David Breitkopf,
MasterCard Tests Device That ‘Hears’ Cloned Cards, AM . BANKER, Mar.
7, 2001, at 6 (discussing an anti-fraud system that would recognize counterfeit
cards based on unique fingerprint-like characteristics of each magnetic stripe,
which produce detectably different sounds when the cards are swiped).
132

See supra note 125 (discussing that problem).
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sophisticated card forgers seem to reside.133 To the extent those
features are ineradicable, the Japanese credit-card industry will
continue to endure fraud losses somewhat higher than those in the
United States.
2.

Discount Rates and Cardholder Fees

Although the issuer nominally bears the losses from
unauthorized transactions in ordinary retail credit-card transactions,
the amount of those losses ineluctably affects the costs that the
cardholders and merchants pay, because they affect the prices that
the system134 must charge in the form of cardholder fees and
discount fees135 in order to remain profitable. Hence, it is natural to
expect that the higher losses from fraud discussed in the previous
section would lead to higher charges to merchants and cardholders.
Those are particularly important to the success of the system,
because they directly influence the willingness of consumers to
obtain the cards and of merchants to accept the cards.

133

Card forgery of a type that will succeed in the face of modern
telephone authorization requires relatively sophisticated fabrication facilities.
Without identifying particular countries mentioned in my interviews, it appears
that several of the countries that tolerate such facilities are located relatively
close to Japan. See RITZER, supra note 33, at 88 (suggesting that Hong Kong
was a prime location for those facilities in the early 1990’s). For those facilities,
the easy international transportation connections into Japan and the luxury goods
available in Japanese department and electronics stores offer a natural target.
See Anonymous Interview Seven, supra note 125.
134

A closed-loop issuer like American Express contracts directly with
both cardholders and merchants that accept the card. In an open-loop system
like Visa, an issuing bank charges fees to cardholders and an acquiring or
merchant bank charges discount fees to merchants. It is typical for the
acquiring bank to pass a set portion of the discount fee to the issuing bank in the
form of an interchange fee. See MANN, supra note 2, at 115-16.
135

The discount fee is the fee that the merchant pays to its acquiring
bank for each credit-card transaction. See MANN, supra note 2, at 115-16.
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Thus, it is no surprise that the objective costs of the Japanese
system seem to be significantly higher than those in the United
States. First, the charges to cardholders, although no more uniform
than in the United States, seem to be substantially higher. The United
States charges are relatively low both because cards with no annual
fees are quite common and because the frequent use of the card
makes the fee per transaction very low (probably only a few pennies
at most).136 – In Japan, by contrast, the fees seem to be much higher
– cards with no annual fee seem to be particularly uncommon – and
the lower number of transactions per card makes the cost per
transaction even higher.137
Because of the wide variations in cardholder fees, my
information on that topic is not particularly firm. The differences in
the charges to merchants, however, are obvious and widely known
within the industry. For the Visa and MasterCard credit-card systems
that dominate the United States market, the discount fee varies
widely depending on the type of merchant, but normally ranges
between one-and-a-half to five percent, with most merchants
seeming to pay something less than two percent. The discount fee
for American Express (the largest competitor) is quite a bit higher,
about 2.75 percent.138 Although it is difficult to get specific
136

See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 165 (American
credit-card issuers derive only 2% of their income from annual fees); see supra
note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the relative frequency of American
card use).
137

See HARMER, supra note 75, at 132-33 (reporting data indicating
that, excluding revenue from cashing commissions, 26% of credit-card industry
revenue (37% of bank-affiliated issuer revenue) is from card members’ fees).
{I exclude revenue from cashing commissions because my purpose is to study
the profitability of credit cards as a payment mechanism. I also exclude the
much smaller share of cashing fees from the analogous statistics about
American credit-card issuers.} Based on credit-card brochures that I collected
during my stay in Japan, I estimate that a typical annual fee is in the range of
¥1500 (a little less than $15).
138

See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 169-72 (discussing
American Express discount fees).
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information, the discount rates in Japan seem to be somewhat higher.
Published sources suggest that rates often are above 5%,139 but in
fact rates seem to be quite a bit lower. Based on my interviews, my
impression is that a typical rate is more commonly in the vicinity of
3-3.5%.140
That difference seems much too large to be explained solely
by the difference in fraud rates: the rate of fraud losses in Japan
exceeds the United States rate by less than one-tenth of one percent
of the gross amount of transactions,141 which hardly could justify a
discount rate more than one percent higher. A much more persuasive
explanation for the higher discount fees is the paucity of credit
transactions. In the United States, credit-card issuers rely heavily on
revenue from interest that their cardholders pay on borrowed funds.
Thus, they can operate profitably with a relatively smaller reliance on
revenue from the merchant.142 For example, credit-card issuers in
the United States derive 88% of their revenues from finance charges
(including late fees), and only 10% from interchange fees.143 In
Japan, revenues from interest are a relatively small portion of the
revenues of the card issuer, about 23% over the industry as a whole,
but only 14% of the revenues of bank-affiliated card issuers who

139

See Would-Be Net Banks Jockey for Position, NIKKEI WEEKLY,
May 8, 2000, at 12 (reporting discount rates of over 5%); Debit Cards Getting
Ready for Big Time, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Feb. 28, 2000 [hereinafter Debit Cards
Getting Ready], at 15 (reporting credit-card discount rates of 3-7%).
140

Because of the highly proprietary character of discount fees, it does
not seem appropriate to identify the specific bases for my impressions with
regard to the United States or Japan.
141

See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text (discussing fraud
rates of 13 basis points in Japan and 6 in the United States).
142

The issuer typically obtains those revenues indirectly through an
interchange fee paid by the bank that acquires the transaction from the
merchant. The acquiring bank pays the fee out of the (presumably larger)
discount that the merchant pays to the acquiring bank. See supra note 135.
143

See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 165.
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have only recently been permitted to extend revolving credit.144
Thus, the issuer’s operations can be profitable only if it obtains a
relatively higher share of revenue from the merchant and the
cardholder. In Japan those fees amount to 77% of all industry
revenues, but 86% of the revenues of bank-affiliated issuers.145 And
in fact the apparent discount rates of 3-4% are not out of line if they
are compared to the rates that American Express charges for its
payment card rather than the rates Visa and MasterCard charge for
their credit cards.146 Because American Express faces the same lack
of interest income that Japanese issuers do, its discount rates
provide a more appropriate benchmark for comparison.

144

See HARMER, supra note 75, at 132-33.

145

See HARMER, supra note 75, at 132-33. Thus, the overall revenue
model closely resembles American Express, which obtains only 15% of its
revenues from finance charges (late fees), but derives 85% of its revenues from
charges to users (66% from the charges it imposes on merchants and 19% from
card fees). See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 165. Indeed, the
most prominent difference is that Japanese bank-affiliated credit-card issuers
impose a smaller share of their user charges on the merchants (57%) than
American Express (78%). {The shares are calculated from the data for
Japanese issuers in HARMER, supra note 75, at 132-33, and from the data for
American Express in EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 165.}
146

See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing American
Express discount fees).
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TABLE TWO
SOURCES OF REVENUE OF U.S. &
JAPANESE CREDIT -CARD ISSUERS
BANK-

VISA &
M ASTERCARD
(U.S.)

AMERICAN
EXPRESS

ALL CARD
ISSUERS
(JAPAN)

Typical
Discount
Rate

1.8%

2.75%

3%

3%

Interest

88%

15%

23%

14%

Merchant/
Interchange
Fees

10%

60%

51%

49%

Card Fees

2%

19%

26%

37%

AFFILIATED
ISSUERS
(JAPAN)

To be sure, the discount rates do appear to be cognizably
higher than those that American Express charges in the United States.
But several structural explanations make that slight difference
readily understandable. Most obviously, a merchant’s selection of an
acquirer in the United States occurs in a relatively competitive
market characterized by a small number of clearing networks with a
large number of potential acquirers in each network. Thus, in the
United States, a typical merchant can gain access to the Visa and
MasterCard systems from any of literally dozens of banks, as well as
a large number of sophisticated third-party acquirers. First Data
surely has a dominating share of the market (more than 40%), but
there are such a large number of competitors of significant size that
the market is relatively competitive,147 in the sense that there is

147

The market shares drop off rapidly after First Data: the second
largest acquirer (Nat’l Processing) has a 13% share. But the number of
significant players is impressive. In 1999 the top 87 companies processed more
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extensive intra-brand competition notwithstanding the limited interbrand competition.148 And even if American Express is the sole way
for a merchant to get access to its cardholders, history shows that the
rates that American Express can charge are affected by the rates that
the larger Visa and MasterCard systems charge.149
In Japan, by contrast, a merchant that wishes to accept credit
cards is confronted with a market featuring a large number of
clearance networks with a relatively small number of potential
acquirers in each market. Most merchants that accept credit cards
find it necessary to make arrangements with several of the large
Japanese systems, because most of those systems clear and process
their own transactions: a typical merchant might accept a dozen or
more different cards and some accept as many as 25.150 Thus, for
each of those systems, the merchant faces a single system operator
with which it must reach an agreement.151 It should be no surprise if

than $1 million of transactions per week. See 1999 US Acquisition Data,
supra note 44, at 9.
148

My sanguine views about the competitiveness of the industry are in
some tension with the views of my government, which has instituted a major
antitrust enforcement proceeding against Visa and MasterCard, generally
arguing that they have colluded to hinder competition and innovation in the
American card industry. For an overview of the case and links to significant
filings, go to http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/indx57.htm. For a vigorous and
scholarly rebuttal of the government’s claims, see Zywicki, supra note 27, at
110-28. In any event, the aspects of the credit-card market that I describe
favorably in this paper are not aspects that the government has challenged in its
action.
149

See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 169-73, 185-97
(discussing pressure on American Express merchant fees arising from the lower
fees charged by Visa and MasterCard).
150
151

See Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 58.

The process works much like the process for American Express
transactions in the United States, which typically are acquired and processed by
the card issuer.
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the charges in that market were higher than they are in the United
States.152

152

To be sure, the limited use of credit cards by Japanese consumers
provides a countervailing influence that arguably could push the discount rates
down. The economics of a merchant’s decision to accept a card turn on the
balance between (A) increased charges (discount fees) on transactions that
otherwise would have been made with cash (or some other payment system
cheaper for the merchant than the credit card); and (B) the likely profit from
new sales that would be gained by accepting cards. See EVANS &
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 121-27. Because the limited penetration of
cards in Japan means that (B) is likely to be lower in Japan than it is in the
United States, a Japanese merchant’s benefit from accepting a card is lower
than the benefit to a corresponding American merchant; that lower benefit
would tend to push discount rates downward.
Yet another complication comes from the relatively small size of
Japanese retailers. Historically, Japanese law protected small retailers through
a complex web of formal and informal constraints that limited competition
among retailers so as to limit the growth and consolidation of retailers. See
generally Frank Upham, Privatizing Regulation: The Implementation of the
Large-Scale Retail Stores Law, in P OLITICAL DYNAMICS IN CONTEMPORARY
JAPAN 264 (Gary D. Allison & Yasunori Sone eds. 1993) (discussing the
complex alliances among Japanese interest groups that finally led to the
introduction of foreign competition and chain retail stores); Frank K. Upham,
Privatized Regulation: Japanese Regulatory Style in Comparative and
International Perspective, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 396, 404-25 (1997) (same).
As long as those constraints limited the size of the typical retailer, they lowered
the profitability to any particular retailer of accepting credit cards, and thus
indirectly should have lowered the market discount rate. As Mark West has
pointed out to me, the rise of large chain stores and consolidation of retailers
occurred at about the same time as banks were permitted entry into the creditcard market. Because that consolidation increased the average size of retailers,
it increased the value to each retailer of accepting credit cards. Hence, to the
extent there are fixed costs in the initial decision to accept credit cards (such as
charges for an authorization terminal, see infra note 154), the increasing size of
retailers should have helped credit-card acceptance to spread among Japanese
retailers.
Giving the cross-cutting effects of those factors, it seems to me at best
difficult to predict that Japanese discount rates would be higher or lower than
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On the other hand, that problem should be mitigated in the
next few years, with the increasing tendency of all of the Japanese
systems to issue cards with the Visa and MasterCard brand; cards
with those brands can be cleared through any entity that is a member
of those networks.153 If competition among members of those
networks lowers the rates for acquisition of transactions of those
brands, the large market presence of those brands should put
pressure on the discount rates for other brands in Japan just as it has
in the United States.154
One last explanation for the higher discount rates is the
relatively small size of the Japanese system. If discount rates are
affected by economies of scale in the development and use of
information technology (as I have argued above),155 then it would be
natural for the Japanese system – in which fewer consumers use their
cards less frequently – to be somewhat more expensive per
transaction than the American system.156 That explanation does not
American rates. The point of the text is only that there are some marketstructure reasons to explain the observation of higher rates.
153

See Anonymous Interview Three, supra note 58.

154

See supra note 149. Another possible explanation for the higher
discount rates is the possibility that Japanese acquirers spend more to provide
authorization terminals for their merchants. Those terminals, which are
relatively expensive, ordinarily are purchased by United States merchants. In at
least some contexts, Japanese acquirers support the costs that their merchants
incur for the acquisition of those terminals. It is clear, however, that there is no
universal practice of acquirers buying the terminals, so it is difficult to quantify
the amount of the difference attributable to that practice. See Anonymous
Interview Four, supra note 58; Anonymous Interview Seven, supra note 125.
155
156

See supra pp. 17-18.

Another reason for the smaller size of the system is Japan’s
relatively restrictive market for credit information. American institutions can
evaluate the creditworthiness and reliability of even the smallest businesses
quickly and accurately. See generally Ronald J. Mann, Information
Technology and Non-Legal Sanctions in Financing Transactions,
forthcoming 54 VAND. L. REV. (May 2001) (discussing the mechanisms by
which businesses are evaluated). That is much more difficult in Japan. See
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necessarily suggest a long-term difference, but it does support a
pattern in which Japanese rates tended to lag above slowly decreasing
American rates. Although the information that I have is sketchy, that
seems to be the case: industry observers and executives believe that
the rates have been dropping already during the last few years.157
Thus, although the fraud problems discussed above suggest that the
rates should never be precisely equal, it seems unlikely (taking
account of limited revenue from credit transactions) that they will be
substantially higher in the long term.
* * * * * * *
In the end, the credit-card systems of the two countries
operate quite differently, in markets of different sizes with different
constraints on the players, facing a customer base that arguably has a
significantly different taste for the credit card. Thus, I finish my
analysis not the least bit surprised by the many differences in the way

eCredit.Com To Start Real-Time B2B Credit Service in Japan, NIKKEI
INDUSTRIAL DAILY, Nov. 1, 2000, available at http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp
(discussing the nascent state of Japanese business credit scoring); see also
supra note 90 (discussing similar problems for consumer credit information).
That problem is exacerbated by the still relatively high number of small
businesses in Japan (see supra note 152) – which makes it all that much more
costly for credit-card networks to gain full penetration of the market. Thus, it is
not surprising that Japanese credit-card acquirers actually exclude many
merchants from their systems because of concerns about merchant character.
See Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 58; Anonymous Interview Three,
supra note 58. Such an exclusion would be almost unheard of in the United
States, where the credit-card systems literally beg merchants to join and accept
their cards. See Telephone Interview with Paul Confrey, Vice President,
Electronic Commerce Planning and Communications, MasterCard (Nov. 10,
1999) [hereinafter Confrey Interview] [transcript on file with author] (transcript
at 4).
157

See, e.g., Credit Industry White Paper, supra note 83, at 14-15;
Anonymous Interview Three, supra note 58; Anonymous Interview Four,
supra note 58; Anonymous Interview Five, supra note 58; Anonymous
Interview Six, supra note 119.
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the cards function in the two countries. If anything, it is surprising
that the results are converging as rapidly as they are.
III. DEBIT CARDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
Credit cards, of course, are not the only card-based payment
system. In the last few years, the use of debit cards has grown
rapidly, especially in the United States.158 A debit card is physically
quite similar to a standard credit card: a piece of plastic of the same
dimensions, with a magnetic stripe on the back. That stripe, like the
stripe on the credit card, includes not only the account number, but
also other information not known to the cardholder; the secret
information is designed to verify transactions in which the card is
swiped at a card-reader. The defining difference from a credit card is
that the debit card necessarily is tied to a particular bank account,159
with the result that funds for transactions that use the card are
withdrawn from the account in one to two business days.160 Most
importantly, the funds are withdrawn from the account without
further action by the cardholder. A corollary of that aspect of the
cards is that debit-card transactions require some form of on-line
connection: the merchant does not accept the card for payment until

158

See infra notes 162-165 and accompanying text.

159

See MANN, supra note 2, at 141-46.

160

See MANN, supra note 40, at 144-46 (discussing United States
collection practices). In Japan, the funds are removed from the cardholder’s
account immediately, but usually not received by the merchant until at least the
third business day. See Nihon Debitto Kâdo Torihiki Suishin Kyôgikai Hômu
Iinkai [Legal Committee, Japan Debit Card Promotion Association], Debitto
Kado no Shikumi Oyobi Sono Hôteki Wakugumi no Gaiyô (1) [The
Structure and Legal Framework of J-Debit (1)], 1573 KINY`û HÔMU 12, 1314 (2000); Kâdo Mâkettingu Kenkyûkai [Society for the Study of Card
Marketing], Debitto Kâdo Dônyû Katsuyô no Tebiki Q & A [Q & A 100,
Information About Debit Cards] qu. 27 (1999) [hereinafter DEBIT CARD Q &
A].
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the merchant can verify with the issuer that the issuer will remove
funds from the cardholder’s account to pay for the transaction.161
The discussion of debit cards proceeds along the same lines
as the discussion of credit cards. This Part starts by discussing and
explaining the differing patterns of usage. It closes with a tentative
discussion of the effectiveness of the still-nascent Japanese debitcard system.
A. Usage in the United States and Japan
1.

Describing the Transactions

In the United States, debit cards are used for about 6% of all
retail payment transactions.162 Because the data from which that
figure is derived include payments sent through the mail (or made
electronically) – payments for which debit-card usage is quite rare –
it substantially understates the debit card’s share of payments made
at the point of sale. Looking solely to retail purchase transactions,
the debit card in 1999 was used in about 32% of all card-based
transactions.163 Even though the debit-card transactions tend to be
relatively small (about $36, as opposed to $76 for the average retail
credit-card transaction),164 they still accounted for 15% of the total
transaction volume at the point of sale (with industry sources

161

See MANN, supra note 2, at 144-46 (discussing United States
collection practices). For Japanese practices, see Article 2 of the model
cardholder agreement [hereinafter J-Debit Cardholder Agreement] published at
Nihon Debitto Ka-do Suishin Kyôgikai Hômu Iinkai [The Legal Committee of
Japan Debit-Card Promotion Association], Debitto Ka-do no Shikumi Oyobi
Sono Hôteki Wakugumi no Gaiyou (5) [The Structure and Legal
Framework of J-Debit (5)], 1583 KIN`YÛ HÔMU 48-53 (2000) (reprinting a
model cardholder agreement.).
162

See 1999 US Payment Systems Data, supra note 1, at 6.

163

See 1999 US Card Data, supra note 3, at 1, 5.

164

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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estimating that they will account for one-third of that volume by
2010).165
The Japanese debit-card system (J-Debit), in contrast, is used
much more rarely. Specifically, J-Debit cards were used in
December 2000 (the last month for which statistics are available) for
just over 500,000 transactions, significantly less than one percent of
all card-based transactions.166 It is interesting that the average debitcard transaction – contrary to U.S. usage – is significantly larger than
the average credit-card transaction: about ¥45,000 for the debit-card
transaction (about $400), as compared to ¥25,000 for the average
credit-card transaction (about $230).167
The ¥40,000 figure is somewhat misleading, because it
reflects a relatively small number of large securities transactions.
News reports from Nihon Keizai Shinbun suggest that securities
transactions averaging about ¥1,000,000 are about a third of all JDebit transactions.168 Even if that figure seems exaggerated, it is
clear that the securities transactions are large and pull the averagetransaction size up significantly.169 Another large component of the

165

See 1999 US Card Data, supra note 3, at 6.

166

I rely on statistics published on the J-Debit home page at
<http://www.debitcard.gr.jp>.
{The
specific
URL
is
http://211.2.244.164/download/48767089/debittorihiki.xls} [hereinafter J-Debit
Home Page].
167

See J-Debit Home Page, supra note 166. The figure in the text is
the average transaction amount over the entire year. That amount should be
taken loosely, because it has varied considerably since March (when the fullscale program began), ranging from a high in June of ¥50,303 ($450) to a low in
September of 41,230 ($370).
168

See Kokusai To Take Debit Cards for Securities Trades, NIKKEI
WEEKLY, July 10, 2000, at 16 (reporting that securities trades are 30% of
nationwide debit-card usage and that the average transaction amount at two
leading brokers (Nomura and Daiwa) is about ¥1,000,000).
169

The only published data from J-Debit (which covers March, the first
month of the full-scale system) suggests that securities transactions amount to
only 1.5% of the transactions, and that the average amount of those transactions
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transactions are relatively large transactions at electronics stores,
doubtless driven by merchant desire to save money on credit-card
transaction fees170 as well as their desire to mitigate the risk of
fraud.171 But even putting those unusually large transactions to one
side, the average transaction would be in the range of ¥24,000 (about
$220),172 much larger than the average American debit-card
transaction.
2.

Explaining the Differences

As with credit cards, the Japanese system differs from the
American system in having a much smaller number of much larger
transactions. The explanation for the transaction size doubtless is
the same here as in the credit-card context. Because the debit-card
system is not yet penetrating the market for small-dollar

was ¥822,400. See Nihon Debitto Kâdo Suishin Kyôgikai [Japan Debit-Card
Promotion Association], Dai ni Fçzu Honkaku Tenkaikara Kagetu Debitto
Kâdo no Riyâga Ôhaba Appu [The Number of Payments Through J-Debit
has Significantly Risen Since the Start of the 2nd Phase], CARDWAVE, June
2000 [hereinafter J-Debit Transaction Breakdown Statistics], at 52.
170

As I explain below, debit cards in the United States are, at least
from the perspective of the merchant, considerably cheaper than credit cards.
See infra notes 195-196 and accompanying text.
171

Electronics dealers might have the largest incentive to urge
customers to use debit cards because they probably have one of the highest
average transaction amounts of any high-volume merchant in Japan. Those
shops also might be driven by a high rate of fraudulent transaction on credit
cards at their store and a desire to limit their potential exposure in those
transactions. See supra note 127 (discussing problems with credit-card fraud at
electronics stores). J-Debit statistics from March 2000 report that transactions
at electronics stores were 34% of all transactions and that they had an average
amount of ¥53,100. See J-Debit Transaction Breakdown Statistics, supra
note 169, at 52.
172

Calculated from J-Debit Transaction Breakdown Statistics, supra
note 169, at 52.
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transactions, cash is being used in Japan for the smaller transactions
for which debit cards commonly are used in the United States.173
But that explanation seems a bit incomplete. The credit-card
system faces similar differences, but it has had a substantial presence
in Japan for decades. The debit-card system, however was only
introduced in the spring of 2000. It is so strange to see a payment
system used for about a quarter of all card-based retail transactions
in the United States being introduced to Japan on a general basis only
this year 174 that some further explanation seems appropriate.
The first point must be that the American debit card, albeit
successful, has not itself been in use for very long. Although they
first were designed in the 1960’s,175 debit cards gained a significant
market share only in the mid 1990’s (just four or five years ago).176
The key event was a fall in the cost of PIN-pad point-of-sale
terminals that made it practicable for merchants to purchase the
terminals.177 So what the evidence suggests for now is a delay in
mass introduction of just a few years – not decades of differences as
in the credit-card system.
Having said that, it remains unclear that the debit card in Japan
ever will develop as successfully as the debit card in the United
States. The basic problem is that neither of the two main market
functions that the debit card serves in the United States present
173

See supra page 34 (articulating a similar explanation for the
relatively large size of Japanese credit-card transactions).
174

A debit-card system called Bank-POS was introduced in Japan in
1984, but remained only as a local, barely used system partly because of
regulations requiring prior written agreement for the transactions. The key
event for the development of J-Debit was the lifting of such restrictions in 1998.
See JAPANESE BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 13, at 19.
175

See D. BAKER ET AL., THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER
SYSTEMS: LEGAL AND STRATEGIC P LANNING ¶ 7.02 (rev. ed. 1999)
(discussing the early history of the use of the debit card at retail locations).
176

See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 298-300.

177

See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 306-15.
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market opportunities as promising in Japan as they do in the United
States. First (speaking as an American debit-cardholder), one of the
primary roles of the American debit card is to accommodate the
relatively limited willingness of American consumers to carry cash.
To the extent they have a rational reason to use a debit card in
preference to a credit card, American consumers use a debit card
because it limits the frequency with which they must go to an ATM
machine or bank to obtain cash. Indeed, the debit card itself for
many of us might be the most convenient source of cash, because
most merchants that accept debit cards at the point of sale allow
cardholders to use the card to withdraw cash in connection with the
purchase.178 Because those transactions carry no fees at all for the
cardholder, they are attractive to consumers. Japanese consumers,
however, tend to carry more cash than American consumers, and also
can obtain much larger amounts of cash at each trip to an automated
teller.179 Thus, their need to use a card for small-dollar purchases is
much smaller. Hence, that market niche for the debit card is much
smaller in Japan.
A second market role that the debit card plays in the United
States is that it allows cardholders the quasi-rational convenience of
paying with a card without having to resist the risky temptation of
overextending themselves with credit purchases.180 But Japanese
178

Because debit cards are so much cheaper for merchants than credit
cards (compare supra Table Two (at page 52) with infra notes 194-195 and
accompanying text), it is rational for the merchants to permit cash withdrawals,
even if those withdrawals increase the fees the merchants must pay to the bank
for the transaction. Setting to the side the cost to the merchant of having the
cash on hand (which seems unlikely to be large enough to alter the decision
significantly), that would be true until the point at which the cash withdrawals
increase the total discount fee to an amount greater than the discount fee would
have been for a credit-card transaction. Because PIN-based debit cards often
have fixed discount fees per transaction, it makes particularly good sense for
merchants that accept those cards to use “cash-back” services as a way to
promote debit-card use.
179

See supra note 15.

180

See RITZER, supra note 33, at 182.
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consumers do not need a debit card to have that comfort. They get it
by accepting ikkai barai as the method of payment with standard
Japanese credit-card transactions. As explained above,181 when a
cardholder pays by ikkai barai (as the overwhelming majority of
Japanese cardholders do), the funds for the transaction are removed
from the bank account without further action by the cardholder.
Thus, the ikkai-barai card does not present nearly the same
temptations to borrowing as the American credit card.
B. The Costs of the System
The Japanese debit-card system is so young that it is
speculative to offer any firm analysis of its effectiveness. But
enough information is available from the general structure to support
generally positive inferences about its future effectiveness.
1.

Fraud Rates

On the issue of fraud, the Japanese system might not be
perfect, but it seems to be much safer than the American system. A
large share (more than two-thirds by value) of American transactions
use the PIN-less182 Visa and MasterCard debit products.183 For
those cards, the fraud losses seem to be about the same as they are
for regular credit cards (six cents per hundred dollars).184 For

181

See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.

182

Traditional debit cards require entry of a personal identification
number (PIN) at the point of sale. The Visa and MasterCard debit products
introduced in the mid-1990’s, however, do not require use of a PIN. For
general discussion, see MANN, supra note 2, at 143-46.
183
184

See 1999 US Card Data, supra note 3, at 7.

See 1999 US Fraud Data, supra note 113, at 4 (aggregating fraud
rates for credit cards and PIN-less cards).
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conventional PIN-based debit cards, however, the fraud rate is much
smaller, about a twentieth as big (0.3 cents per hundred dollars).185
In the J-Debit system, by contrast, all transactions are PINbased.
Thus, you would expect the fraud rate to be somewhere
near the American fraud rate of only 0.3 cents per hundred dollars.
And early results suggest that fraud is not yet a serious problem.187
To be sure, there are a few causes for concern. One problem is that
the Japanese banking system traditionally has not used encryption for
PIN-number transmissions because all ATM machines have been in
secure locations (generally inside bank locations). Thus, unlike the
United States, the use of debit cards at the point of sale is the first
time that cards giving access to a bank account have used terminals
that access the bank’s computers over an open network.188 It is thus
the first occasion at which the use of encryption has been crucial to
safety of the system. Still, although it necessarily is difficult to
evaluate the security of the system from the outside, the available
information suggests that J-Debit is conscious of the need for
reliable encryption.189
186

185

See 1999 US Fraud Data, supra note 113, at 4.

186

See J-Debit Cardholder Agreement, supra note 161, art. 2.

187

As of January 2001, J-Debit still reports no claims of unauthorized
transactions in its system. See Lower Debit Card Limits, supra note 15 (no
reports of fraudulent transactions as of January 2001); Debit Card Usage
Exceeds 100 Bln Yen in Jan-Oct, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 13, 2000,
available at http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp [hereinafter Debit Card Usage]
(same as of October 2000).
188

I use the term “open” to describe those networks because there are
places from which customers (or interlopers) can access the network that are
not within the control of the financial institution. See Naoyuki Iwashita,
Business Needs for Cryptographic Technology in Japan’s Financial
Industry <http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/kouen/n9903.pdf> (discussing
historical use of leased lines for ATM-card transactions in Japan).
189

It appears that J-Debit contemplates encryption of transmissions
from the merchant to the clearance center by the same DES encryption used in
the United States. See Japan Settlement Information Center, Ltd. <http://www.
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Observers also worry that PINs in Japan are not as secure as
PINs in the United States, relying on surveys indicating that about
1/3 of Japanese use their birthdays as their PIN numbers.190 If a
significant number of debit cards are stolen, that could become
something of a problem. Still, that seems such an easy problem to
fix that it is difficult to believe that the system operators would allow
it to become a significant problem. For example, a system in which
banks assign the PINs (as often happens in the United States) would
solve much of the problem immediately.191 On the other hand, it is
not nearly so clear how system operators can assuage the strong
consumer perception that the system is unsafe.192

jpsic.co.jp/servis2.html>; Iwashita, supra note 188, at 1 (discussing use of DES
encryption for United States PIN transmissions).
190

See Debit Cards Getting Ready, supra note 139, at 15 (“Critics
also warn that personal identification codes can be stolen while being punched in
at the store.”).
191

It would be plausible to expect that Japanese system operators
would have less concern than American operators because the Japanese
system places the risk of loss from unauthorized transactions on cardholders,
while the American legal system requires the issuers to bear that risk.
Compare Aoki v K. K. Fujibank, 1369 KINY`û HÔMU 6-8 (Sup. Ct., July 19,
1993) (upholding a provision of a Japanese ATM-card agreement, holding that
absent some special circumstance a bank is not responsible when somebody
other than the cardholder withdraws cash from an ATM with the authentic card
and correct PIN); with 15 U.S.C. § 1693g, Electronic Funds Transfer Act §
909 (limiting liability of debit-card holder for unauthorized U.S. transactions to
$50, unless the cardholder fails to report either the theft of the card or
unauthorized transactions that appear on the cardholder’s statement);
Regulation E, 12 CFR § 205.6 (same). But the generally superior design of the
Japanese system (that is, its universal use of PINs) suggests that those legal
provisions are not unduly undermining the incentive of the Japanese operators to
limit fraud losses.
192

See Only 3% of Japanese Use Debit Cards on Security Worries,
NIHON
KEIZAI
SHIMBUN,
Dec.
22,
2000,
available
at
http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp (reporting survey indicating that 48% of respondents
cited security concerns as their primary reason for not using the cards).
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The fact is, the United States systems that have used PINs for
years have experienced very low rates of losses compared to card
systems that do not use PINs. And even those rates seem misleading,
because, according to industry observers, the losses are almost
entirely attributable to so-called “friendly” fraud: unauthorized
transactions by individuals (spouses, children, paramours) to whom
the cardholders voluntarily delivered the card and PIN.193 It seems
surprising, but there appear in the United States to be no quantifiable
number of transactions in which interlopers have managed to steal
both a card and a PIN and successfully conduct transactions before
the cardholder advises its bank of the theft. For me, the lesson of
that experience is that Japan’s entirely PIN-based system should be
quite secure.
2.

Discount Rates

Despite the relatively robust anti-fraud protections, the
Japanese system currently is considerably more expensive for the
participants in the transactions than the American system. Although
rates differ considerably from merchant to merchant, a typical
merchant would pay at least ¥50 on a ¥5,000 transaction.194 In the

193

Compare Kono v. Otsuyama, 1048 HANREI HANREI JIHÔ 109
(Tokyo High Ct. Apr. 28, 1982) (concluding that a man who gave his cash card
to a woman with whom he had a romantic relationship implicitly consented to
her withdrawal of funds with the card in any amount that suited her).
194

See DEBIT CARD Q & A, supra note 160, qu. 54 (explaining that the
discount rate varies based on negotiations between the acquiring bank and the
merchant, and that it typically ranges from 1-3%). As a matter of structure, the
discount fee that the acquiring bank collects from the merchant must be more
than the interchange fee that the acquiring bank pays to the issuing bank. See
supra note 142 (discussing relation between merchant discount fees and
interchange fees in the credit-card context). In the J-Debit system, the
interchange fee currently is 1%, with a floor of 3 yen and a ceiling of 100 yen.
See id.
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United States, a grocery store with a similar transaction probably
would pay the equivalent of ¥15-20 (about 15-20 cents).195
Although the fee for now is higher than the analogous fees in
the United States, it seems unlikely to be a substantial problem. For
one thing, even though the fee is higher than the analogous U.S. fee,
it still is lower than the fee for any competing Japanese payment
system.196 For another, the rates have not yet stabilized during the
short life of the system; one observer suggested that the rates are
lower now than they were in the initial months of the system.197
Finally, the structure of the market should foster considerable
competition that eventually should lead to good rates. The key point
is that there is only one debit-card network for the whole country and
each merchant needs access to that network from only a single
bank.198 That is the same many-acquirers/few-networks pattern that
195

See Miriam Kreinin Souccar, Despite Merchants, Off-Line Debit
Taking Off, AM . BANKER, June 9, 1999, available at 1999 WL 6036025.
196

The fee is cognizably lower than the fee for a bank transfer, the
other common method of non-cash consumer payment in Japan. See supra
note 82 (discussing Japanese use of bank transfers). {It is difficult to generalize
about bank-transfer fees, because the fee structures typically have several tiers
and differ from bank to bank. The cheapest fees for transfers to an account at
a different bank, however, typically exceed ¥100.
See
<http://www.btm.co.jp/listj/tesuu.htm> (fees for Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank);
<http://www.fujibank.co.jp/jis /fb/service/tesuuryou.html> (fees for Fuji Bank).}
For comparison’s sake, the J-Debit fee is considerably lower than the fees that
Visa and MasterCard acquirers charge in the United States for their PIN-less
debit-card products. Those higher fees have disturbed American merchants,
but have not stopped the rapid spread of use of the cards. See Lisa Fickensher,
Visa Hires Exec To Strengthen Relationships with Merchants, AM .
BANKER, Mar. 12, 1999, at 8 (discussing a lawsuit brought by a group of
merchants including Wal-Mart and Sears, against MasterCard and Visa,
challenging the rules requiring merchants to accept the PIN-less debit-card
products issued by MasterCard and Visa members).
197

See Anonymous Interview Eight, Tokyo (Sept. 28, 2000)
[hereinafter Anonymous Interview Eight].
198

See Anonymous Interview Eight, supra note 197.
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United States merchants face when they want access to credit-card
networks.199 Thus, all of the banks in Japan that want to be in the
business of capturing J-Debit transactions must compete for the
business of each merchant.200
To be sure, long-term merchant/bank relationships might give
merchants a significant preference for a particular bank within their
corporate family. But those relationships in the Japanese financial
industry seem to be weakening rapidly.201 At this point, it is difficult
to believe that those relationships will be sufficiently strong to
permit banks to charge uncompetitive rates to related-company
merchants for their debit transactions. If one bank charges
significantly better rates for the service than its competitors, it is
highly likely to obtain a substantial share of the market.202 Thus, it
seems unlikely that high system costs will pose an obstacle to the
success of the system.
* * * * * * *
It is much harder to draw firm conclusions about the Japanese
debit-card system than the Japanese credit-card system, because its
baseline of operation is so short. But its major problem seems to be
that much of its market niche has been occupied by the general
mutation of the credit card in Japan into something that closely
resembles the debit card in the United States. The only real
differences that a debit card brings to Japanese consumers are that
(a) the more secure authorization (discussed in the next section)
makes the transactions safer (at least compared to credit-card
transactions); and (b) the funds are removed from the account much

199

See supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.

200

See Anonymous Interview Eight, supra note 197.

201

See HARMER, supra note 75, at 142-43.

202

See DKB Dominates Debit Card Deals, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN,
Oct. 19, 2000, at 1, 1 (reporting that Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank has succeeded in
becoming the sole or primary provider of debit-card settlement services for 54%
of the merchants in the J-Debit program).
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more rapidly. Neither of those differences benefits cardholders
significantly, so neither is likely to push consumers toward the card
rapidly. Moreover, consumer fears of losses from inadequate
security (whether or not rational) could hinder the system even
more.
Thus, although the system is much cheaper for the parties to
transactions, much more secure, and much more accommodating to
any Japanese preferences for transactions that resemble “cash
payment” and avoid any hint of borrowing, it seems to have a
relatively limited chance of broad success in Japan. Absent any
strong reason for consumers to use the card – and no such reason
seems apparent at this point – it may languish as a relatively minor
system, as it did in the United States for so many years.203
IV. CONCLUSION
The basic message of this paper is a simple one: institutions
matter. Financial systems that develop in one country cannot be
transplanted without change to other countries that have different
institutional settings. If they are transplanted – as the debit card and
credit card have been – then the roles that they play will shift to
account for the backgrounds in which they are placed as surely as the
growth of new plants seeks the spaces between plants already nearby.
An understanding of the factors that influence that growth is
important not only to the businesses that want to develop more
effective payment systems, but also to policy analysts who want to
limit the develop of payment systems that can have harmful effects
on those that use them.

203

See supra note 175 and accompanying text.

